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ABSTRACT
Human worth has taken on a surprising new role: that of market asset.
Specifically, lenders in radically different contexts are using their
borrowers’ human worth as collateral in loan transactions. The two
examples of this new collateralization that I examine are credit card lending
in the United States and microlending programs in the Third World. I
conclude that the use of human worth in these two contexts is too similar to
be coincidental. Rather, this new collateralization is a product of
globalization. For those interested in the effect of law on globalization, this
convergence in the market for credit teaches important lessons. In both the
contexts I examine, the laws governing secured and unsecured lending fail
to recognize human worth as collateral. For this reason, the new
collateralization serves as a counter-example to the claimed centrality of the
rule of law in economic development.

INTRODUCTION
A powerful convergence is occurring among radically different markets
for credit. Lenders with little else in common are using human worth1 as
collateral in credit transactions. Yet the law has failed to recognize this new
collateralization so completely that the idea of human worth as collateral
seems quite shocking. This failure suggests that the formal rule of law is a
less effective disseminator of utilitarian norms than its proponents believe,
while the globalizing market for credit is quite effective. The emergence of
this new collateralization thus challenges the primacy of the rule of law at a
time when many are touting it as the key to economic development.
This article examines two modern examples of this new collateralization
that are at geographical, economic, and cultural extremes. The first occurs
in the context of credit card lending to consumers in the United States. The
*
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I will discuss the more specific and nuanced variants of human worth as collateral in Part III.

2

Rashmi Dyal-Chand

second occurs in microlending programs used widely in developing
countries as a means of economic development of the poor. The first
involves middle class2 people in the First World.3 The second example
involves impoverished women in the Third World. The two socio-cultural
settings could not be more distinct. Yet, stated bluntly, in both cases human
worth has taken on a new role as a market asset: the subject of
quantification, collateralization, and even liquidation.
This article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly reviews collateral in loan
transactions to delineate its advantages and key features. As I discuss, its
key features are generally the things that make collateral useful to lenders.
Part I also discusses the relationship between collateral and the rule of law.
I discuss the traditional assumption that legal rules governing secured
lending and other areas of commerce are integral to economic development.
If this assumption is correct, it should mean that the law accurately reflects
(indeed dictates) what can be collateralized and how collateral is used. I
begin here to lay the groundwork for my analysis in Part II of human worth
as collateral.
Part II, the heart of this article, sets forth the basis for my hypothesis
that lenders in very different contexts have begun to collateralize human
worth. I build my case on two examples. The first is the puzzlingly high
level of unsecured lending to American consumers by means of the credit
card, despite the ease of secured home equity lending. I conclude that this
mystery is partly explained by credit card lenders' collateralization of
human worth through the mechanism of credit reporting. The second
example is the puzzlingly high level of unsecured lending to impoverished
rural women in Bangladesh by means of the Grameen Bank's microlending
program. I conclude that this mystery is also explained by the lender's
collateralization of human worth, this time through the mechanism of peer
lending.

2
This article uses the term "middle class" to refer to members of US society in the middle and upper
economic classes, and to distinguish this group of people from those who cannot easily participate (or participate
at all) in the mainstream market for credit, housing and other services.
3
This article uses the terms "First World" and the "West" interchangeably and "Third World" and the "East"
interchangeably because these are the most recognizable terms used, including in the scholarly literature. See,
e.g., HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD WORLD (1990); PAUL
W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 4 (1999) ("third world");
Dustin N. Sharp, Prosecutions, Development, and Justice: The Trial of Hissein Habré, 16 HARVARD HUM. RTS. J.
147 (2003) ("third world"); Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy, And Ethnicity: Toward A New Paradigm for Law
and Development, 108 YALE L. J. 1 (1998) ("West"); CHANDRA TALPADE MOHANTY, ET AL., THIRD WORLD
WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF FEMINISM (1991); GAYATRI CHAKRAVORTY SPIVAK, Can the Subaltern Speak?, in
MARXISM AND THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE 271, 296-97 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg eds., 1988)
("third world"). These terms are less than ideal, however, not least of all because they contribute to overgeneralizations.
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In this part, I return to the literature on secured lending explicitly to
analyze the market value of human worth as collateral. I conclude that,
from an economic perspective, human worth has several characteristics that
make it a valuable asset, and that these features allow lenders to use it much
as they would use any other type of collateral. However, the law does not
recognize human worth as collateral. Nor does it recognize human worth as
relevant to unsecured lending decisions, for example as a substitute for
collateral. Importantly, my purpose in analyzing human worth as collateral
is not to challenge the distinction between secured and unsecured lending. I
acknowledge the bright line between these two forms of lending and the
possibility that legal recognition of lenders' use of human worth might not
result in changes to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code or its
Bangladeshi equivalent.4 Rather, my purpose is to show that lenders have
succeeded in capturing a valuable new asset as leverage, but that the law has
been irrelevant to this important new development in lending.
In Part III, I begin the process of understanding what this new form of
collateral really is. I do so both to clarify what exactly is at stake and to
understand whether the same thing is at stake in both my examples. Using
legal and philosophical discussions of personhood, property and dignity, I
explore the social construction of human worth as collateral. I conclude
that it is not entirely clear what this new collateral is, but that certain
cultural images of dignity and personhood seem to fit. These images
resonate in both my examples, suggesting that human worth as collateral
has at least some features that are surprisingly homogenous, despite
extensive socio-cultural differences.
In Part IV, I reflect on what these two examples might teach about my
hypothesis. I conclude that globalization has played a central role in
producing the convergence among lending practices described here.
However, contrary to the expectations of rule of law proponents, it appears
to be the credit market, rather than law, that has produced the utilitarian use
of human worth as collateral.
I. COLLATERAL: ITS ADVANTAGES, FEATURES AND RELATIONSHIP TO THE
RULE OF LAW
Collateral is "[p]roperty that is pledged as security against a debt."5
4
In discussing the law on secured lending, I focus more on secured transactions law rather than real estate
law, because to the extent human worth can be described as property and collateral, it is personal property rather
than real property.
5
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004). Security is "[c]ollateral given or pledged to guarantee the
fulfillment of an obligation; esp[ecially] the assurance that a creditor will be repaid (usu[ually] with interest) any
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A. Advantages

Legal and economic scholarship has largely answered the question why
lenders require collateral.6 The most obvious reason is that collateral serves
as a means of collecting payment by foreclosure or repossession.7 But
neither foreclosure nor repossession presents an easy path to repayment,8
and it is questionable whether lenders would engage in as much secured
lending as they do if this was the only advantage of collateral.9 Empirical
research suggests that collateral also benefits lenders by motivating
borrowers to behave prudently.10 The fear of losing an important asset
prevents borrowers from taking risks that they otherwise might have
taken.11 A related benefit is that collateral motivates the borrower to repay
the loan voluntarily.12 Collateral also saves lenders the costs of monitoring
the borrower's behavior.13 By taking a security interest in a specific asset,
the lender needs only to monitor the borrower's use of that asset, primarily
to ensure that the borrower does not pledge it to anyone else, sell it, or
otherwise compromise the lender's interest in it.14 Whether because of the
rise in intellectual property as collateral or otherwise, contemporary secured
lending seems to emphasize these additional benefits while relying less on
the original purpose of collateral as a means of payment collection.15
money or credit extended to a debtor." Id. Unless otherwise specified, I will use the terms security and collateral
interchangeably in this article.
6
The reason seems the same when the collateral is real or personal. Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern
of Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REV. 625, 639 (1996-97) [hereinafter Mann, Explaining the Pattern]. See
generally LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS APPROACH (1995).
7
WILLIAM D. WARREN & STEVEN D. WALT, SECURED TRANSACTIONS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 2 (2004);
Mann, Explaining the Pattern, supra note 6, at 639; Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA.
L. REV. 1887, 1921-23 (1994); David Gray Carlson, On the Efficiency of Secured Lending, 80 VA. L. REV. 2179,
2188-89 (1994).
8
Even in states allowing non-judicial foreclosure, it is a relatively time-consuming and rigorous process,
regulating such things as notice and rights of redemption. GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL
ESTATE FINANCE LAW 582-583 (4th ed. 2001); GEORGE E. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES, 732-736 (2d. ed. 1970).
Similarly, notice requirements and prohibitions on breaching the peace typically limit even self-help
repossessions. CAROLYN L. CARTER ET AL., NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, REPOSSESSIONS AND
FORECLOSURES, Chapter 6 (5th ed. 2002).
9
There is a growing literature that argues that the benefit of foreclosure or repossession is not necessarily
what drives lenders to take security interests. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Secured Credit And Software Financing,
85 Corn L. Rev. 134, 138-154 (1999) [hereinafter Software Financing]; Mann, Explaining the Pattern, supra note
6, at 639-640; Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 950 (1986).
My hypothesis that lenders are using human worth as collateral lends some support to this position.
10
Mann, Explaining the Pattern, supra note 6, at 641. For non-empirical support for this argument, see
Carlson, supra note 7, at 2186-89,
11
Indeed, Carlson argues that fear is the primary benefit of secured lending. Carlson, supra note 7, at 2188.
12
ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS: TEXT,
CASES, AND PROBLEMS 4-5 (5th ed., 2006); Mann, Explaining the Pattern, supra note 6, at 646.
13
Mann, Explaining the Pattern, supra note 6, at 650-651; Carlson, supra note 7, at 2189-90; Scott, supra
note 9, at 909-910.
14
Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L. J. 49, 51-52
(1982).
15
See Mann, Software Financing, supra note 9, at 136. This is not to say that these additional benefits
themselves are new, but rather that they seem to have even more primacy in contemporary transactions.
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The aggregate effect of these advantages to the lender is that the lender
is able to provide credit at lower costs than it otherwise would.16
Conventional thinking is that this is also the primary benefit to borrowers
because it allows borrowers who might otherwise not qualify for a loan to
do so, thereby improving their economic condition.17
B. Features
From these advantages, it is possible to develop a list of features that are
fundamental to the definition of collateral. First, the lender will not have a
specific enough basis for underwriting its loan unless the collateral is fixed
in the sense of being quantifiable by the lender. This feature also, of course,
allows the collateral to serve as a means of collecting payment.18 This does
not necessarily mean that collateral must be physical; intellectual
property,19 payment intangibles,20 and good will21 are all regularly used as
collateral for business loans. In the consumer context, stocks and bonds can
serve as collateral. Second, collateral generally must be capable of
liquidation, because the lender must have a means of taking something
meaningful away from the borrower. Consider a piece of intellectual
property, such as a process for turning lead into gold. If the borrower
secures a loan using this process as collateral and then defaults on the loan,
the lender must have a way to prevent the borrower from continuing to use
the process for free or to license it to others. Otherwise, the borrower will
have no incentive to repay the loan.22 The possibility of liquidation is also
important because most lenders would prefer to sell the asset for cash rather
than acquire the asset as a means of economic production.
A third feature that enhances an asset's value as collateral is its ability to
appreciate in value. Real estate serves as a useful example here too. When
16

Carlson, supra note 7, at 2190-91.
Carlson, supra note 7, at 2190-95. Thus, collateral helps to avoid the problem of credit rationing. See
Keith N. Hylton, Banks And Inner Cities: Market And Regulatory Obstacles To Development Lending, 17 YALE J.
ON REG. 197, 212-217 (2000). See generally Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets
with Imperfect Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393 (1981).
18
See, e.g., Roy N. Freed, Security Interests in the Computer Age: Practical Advice for the Secured Lender,
101 BANKING L. J. 404 (1984) (both needs are discussed in the context of intellectual property as collateral).
19
Id. See also U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. 5(d) (2005) ("General intangible" is the residual category of personal
property, including things in action, that is not included in the other defined types of collateral. Examples are
various categories of intellectual property and the right to payment of a loan of funds that is not evidenced by
chattel paper or an instrument.”).
20
U.C.C. § 9-102(61) (2005) ("’Payment intangible’" means a general intangible under which the account
debtor's principal obligation is a monetary obligation.”)
21
See, e.g., Bank of Washington v. Burgraff, 687 P.2d 236, 240 (Wash. App. 1984).
22
See generally Freed, supra note 18 (discussing the ways in which to secure intellectual property so that it
can be efficiently foreclosed upon). Professor Mann strongly refutes the importance of this feature in his
empirical study of software financing. See generally Mann, Software Financing, supra note 9.
17
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a piece of property appreciates, the lender has more of a cushion to cover its
loan, more leverage with which to constrain the borrower's behavior,23 and
more opportunity to be creative in finding remedies that protect its own
interests while not being as onerous for the borrower.24
Fourth, to increase the likelihood both that the borrower will behave
prudently and that she will repay the loan voluntarily, the collateral must be
meaningful to the borrower. Obviously, if a borrower collateralizes a trade
secret that is not central to her business (or, in the consumer context, a
watch that he finds ugly rather than his wedding ring25), she will not be as
motivated to behave as carefully as if she had collateralized a secret that
was central to her business. Fifth, collateral that is easy, and thus not
costly, to monitor is also more attractive to lenders.26
A sixth feature of collateral is that it can be repossessed or transferred.
Although this feature was essential to fulfilling collateral’s original purpose
of payment collection, it appears less essential in contemporary lending
practices. As Ronald Mann’s discussion of software as collateral shows,
this feature is largely irrelevant to the thriving industry of secured lending
to software firms.27 Indeed, Professor Mann’s work equally implicates the
importance of ease of liquidation as a feature of collateral.28
These features are neither exhaustive nor mandatory in defining
collateral. Nor are they ubiquitously identified in the literature as the
defining features of collateral. I suspect this is true in part because they are
so obvious. Indeed, I have developed them through a deductive process of
analyzing the advantages of collateral that are well-recognized in
scholarship.
Nonetheless, secured transactions law does implicitly
recognize these features. Uniform Commercial Code Section 9-108, for
example, requires more than a “supergeneric” identification of the property,
presumably so that it can be quantified by the creditor.29 Moreover, the
23

Shared appreciation mortgages exemplify these advantages, allowing the lender to share in the
appreciation of the mortgaged property as more of an “owner.” For discussions of shared appreciation mortgages,
see Ronald Friend, Shared Appreciation Mortgages, 34 HASTINGS L. J. 329 (1982); Helen Jean Walleser,
Balancing the Interest: The Changing Complexion of Home Mortgage Financing in America, 31 DRAKE L. REV.
1 (1981-82).
24
GERALD KORNGOLD & PAUL GOLDSTEIN, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 807 (4th ed. 2002).
25
I adopt here Margaret Jane Radin’s example of the wedding ring as a personal object that is typically very
important to the wearer. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959-961 (1982)
[hereinafter, Property and Personhood].
26
For discussions of the benefits of security in lowering the costs of lenders’ monitoring activities, see
Mann, Explaining the Pattern, supra note 6, at 650-651; Levmore, supra note 14; Carlson, supra note 7, at 218990.
27
See generally Mann, Software Financing, supra note 9.
28
Id.
29
U.C.C. § 9-108(c) (2005). The description requirement in consumer transactions is even more stringent.
See U.C.C. § 9-108(e) (2005). As described in the official comment to this section, § 9-108(e) “requires greater
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infrastructure of Article 9 obviously serves the purpose of allowing priority
in liquidation of assets.30
C. Collateral and the Rule of Law
The rule of law is a cornerstone of Western law and policy. As Brian
Tamanaha recently stated in his comprehensive discussion of its history, the
“apparent unanimity in support of the rule of law is a feat unparalleled in
history.
No other single political ideal has ever achieved global
endorsement.”31 Although the definition of the rule of law is more
contested than its importance, a relatively standard description is that the
rule of law requires clear, transparent and generally applicable legal rules
that are stable over time, and further that there must be “consistency
between the rules and the actual conduct of legal actors.”32 It is also
orthodoxy, at least among Western development specialists, that the rule of
law is critical to economic development,33 at least in part because it reduces
costs by allowing market participants to predict the legal effects of their
actions.34 Indeed, some have described the rule of law as the key factor
required to mimic the economic success of Western markets.35
Given the importance both of the rule of law and of credit to Western
economies,36 we should expect to see well-developed secured transactions
laws in the West and attempts to transfer them to developing countries.37
And we do. In the US, for example, many hours were recently dedicated to

specificity of description in order to prevent debtors from inadvertently encumbering certain property.”). U.C.C.
§ 9-108 cmt. 5 (2005)
30
U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. 1 (2002) (Article 9 "provides a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of security
interests in personal property and fixtures."). See also Carlson, supra note 7, at 2190-92;
31
BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 3 (2004).
32
Id. at 93, summarizing the definition propounded by Lon Fuller. Additionally, the rule of law means
“prohibitions against retroactivity, against contradictions and against requiring the impossible.” Id. Professor
Tamanaha describes this as the predominant “formal” version of the rule of law, as distinguished from the more
substantive versions which include conceptions of individual rights or other “moral” content. Id. at 91-92.
33
Id. at 2.
34
Id. at 119. For this reason, both the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have strongly
endorsed the rule of law as a condition of financial assistance. Id. at 2.
35
See generally, HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL (2000) (focusing on formalization of
property rights). For additional definitions and general discussions of the rule of law, see John K.M. Ohnesorge,
The Rule of Law, Economic Development, and the Development States of Northeast Asia, in LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 91 (Christoph Antons, ed., 2003); RANDALL PEERENBOOM,
CHINA'S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW (2002).
36
I will discuss the enormous importance of credit to US consumers in Part II.A.1.
37
I am accepting for these purposes the common view that the West is economically more developed than
the East, and further, that this prompts the West to attempt to develop Eastern economies. For discussions of
these common assumptions, see Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for
Law and Development, 108 YALE L. J. 1 (1998); David Kennedy, The International Anti-Corruption Campaign,
14 CONN. J. OF INT'L L. 455 (1999); James Thuo Gathii, Retelling Good Governance Narratives on Africa's
Economic and Political Predicaments: Continuities and Discontinuities in Legal Outcomes Between Markets and
States, 45 VILL. L. REV. 971 (2000).
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revising Article 9.38 Secured transactions law is also prominently among
the array of laws exported by the US and Western Europe to newly
independent and developing countries.39 The prominence of secured
transactions law rests on at least two assumptions. The first assumption is
that lenders will value the predictability, transparency and clarity resulting
from legal rules governing the behavior of parties in secured lending
transactions.40 The second is that secured transactions law accurately
reflects, if not dictates, important aspects of the parties’ behavior. If this
second assumption was not true, then the rule of law obviously would not
succeed as well in promoting predictability.
Thus, we should also expect to see secured transactions laws, in both
their original US and exported versions, predicting and managing what can
be collateralized, the terms of secured lending and the consequences of
defaults. As the examples in Part II show, however, the law of secured
lending does not appear to play nearly so central a role.
II. HUMAN WORTH IN THE MARKETPLACE FOR CREDIT
In this section, I discuss a pair of mysteries. The first is the high volume
of unsecured consumer lending in the US, most prominently in the form of
credit card lending, despite the ease of secured lending (namely home
equity lending). The second is the high volume of unsecured loans to, and
extraordinarily low default rate of, impoverished borrowers involved in peer
lending microcredit programs, most prominently that of the Grameen Bank
in Bangladesh.41 Using traditional assumptions, the lenders' behavior in
each of these circumstances does not appear rational. Given the advantages
of security that I have outlined above, in both contexts, the risk of borrower
default should cause lenders either to require collateral or not to lend as
extensively. Yet in both, lenders do lend extensively without requiring
collateral, and the rate of borrower default is surprisingly low.42
38

For a discussion of some of the effects of the revisions, see Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger & Michael G.
Hillinger, 2001: A Code Odyssey (New Dawn for the Article 9 Secured Creditor), 106 COMMERCIAL L. J. 105
(2001).
39
See, e.g., David S. Bernstein, Process Drives Success: Key Lessons From a Decade of Legal Reform, in
LAW IN TRANSITION, 2-13 (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 2002).
40
TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 119.
41
These mysteries present the same basic question: why is there so much unsecured lending? As I discuss,
although there is a powerful convergence between cultures causing lenders to lend so extensively on an unsecured
basis, there are also many contributing factors that are specific to each society.
42
Regarding default rates in the US, see, e.g., Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan The mortgage market
and consumer debt at America’s Community Bankers Annual Convention, Washington, D.C. October 19, 2004,
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/BOARDDOCS/Speeches/2004/20041019/default.htm ("In recent
years, banks and thrifts have been experiencing low delinquency rates on home mortgage and credit card debt, a
situation suggesting that the vast majority of households are managing their debt well."). The questions of
whether the default rate of consumer credit card borrowers is high or low, and whether it should be lower, are both
quite contested, however. See, e.g., Walter V. Robinson and Beth Healy, Regulators, Policy Makers Seldom
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I hypothesize that both mysteries are partly explained by the
collateralization of something more ethereal even than good will, namely
human worth. As I discuss, human worth as collateral has many of the
features of collateral. However, laws governing both secured and unsecured
lending have failed to recognize the new leveraging of human worth.
A. Credit Reporting
“Manuela Cormier is one among the millions. Waiting with 100 other
forlorn debtors in a three-hour queue at the New Bedford District court last
Nov. 30, Cormier stood convicted of misfortune: Five years ago, the 45year-old single mother lost her job and had no money to make payments on
a $1000 credit card bill. The combination of a 29 percent interest rate,
penalty fees, and court-imposed costs have since pushed the bill close to
$4,000. Cormier was told she would be jailed if she did not pay.”43
Recent scholarship has focused significant attention on the enormous
amounts of debt shouldered by American consumers.44 Much of this
consumer debt is secured (often in the form of home equity loans, which are
still on the rise45).46 A vast amount of consumer debt, however, is
Intervene, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 2, 2006, http://www.boston.com/news/special/spotlight_debt/part4/page1.html
(describing “alarming” date from Experian that approximately 20 million Americans are at least 3 months past
due on credit card accounts). Regarding default rates in the Grameen Bank program, see Grameen Bank
Homepage, Credit Delivery System, http://www.grameen-info.org/bank/cds.html (stating that the repayment rate
of borrowers is currently 95%).
43
Robinson & Healy, supra note 42.
44
See, e.g., TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS 18 (2000) (“From 1980 to 1994,
total household debt had increased from 65 percent to 81 percent of total income. In short, real consumer debt has
risen dramatically over a long period during which real incomes for many people have stated the same or
declined.”). See generally ROBERT D. MANNING, CREDIT CARD NATION (2000); LLOYD KLEIN, IT'S IN THE
CARDS: CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (1999); JAMES MEDOFF & ANDREW HARLESS, THE
INDEBTED SOCIETY: ANATOMY OF AN ONGOING DISASTER (1996); Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW.
U. L. REV. 1373 (2004); Julia Patterson Forrester, Mortgaging the American Dream: A Critical Evaluation of the
Federal Government's Promotion of Home Equity Financing, 69 TUL. L. REV. 373, 377 (1994).
45
Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan The mortgage market and consumer debt, at America’s
Community
Bankers
Annual
Convention,
Washington,
D.C.
October
19,
2004
http://www.federalreserve.gov/BOARDDOCS/Speeches/2004/20041019/default.htm (home equity loans were
still on the rise as of Greenspan's 2004 speech); David Myron, Home Equity Debt Soars, AMERICAN
DEMOGRAPHICS
(Nov
1,
2004),
available
at
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m4021/is_9_26/ai_n6344044 (relying on statistics maintained by the
Federal
Deposit
Insurance
Corporation,
available
at
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/regional/ro20044q/na/2004winter_03.html).
46
According to 2003 Census figures, approximately 65 percent of homeowners had mortgages of some sort
on their homes.
U.S. Census Bureau, American Housing Survey for the United States: 2003,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/ahs/ahs03/tab315.htm. Moreover, Professors Sullivan, Warren and
Westbrook state, on the basis of 1991 census figures, that "[m]ore than 90 percent of homebuyers need a mortgage
to purchase a home." SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 206. 2003 census data show that more than 15 percent
of all housing owned in the US is encumbered by home equity lump-sum mortgages and/or lines of credit. U.S.
Census
Bureau,
American
Housing
Survey
for
the
United
States:
2003,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/ahs/ahs03/tab315.htm.
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unsecured. Perhaps the prototypical example of contemporary unsecured
consumer debt is credit card borrowing.47 Such borrowing takes the form of
credit card balances carried over from month to month.48 Although credit
cards can be used simply as a form of payment, 75 percent of Americans
who own credit cards49 use them as a means of borrowing money.50
Given the extraordinary willingness of Americans to mortgage their
homes in exchange for cash,51 as evidenced by the boom in home equity
loans, it is puzzling that so many lenders are willing to lend such vast
amounts without requiring some form of collateral.52 The mystery is not
explained by industry specialization, as many banks53 that engage in
mortgage lending also issue credit card debt.54 Even more mysterious is the
fact that, in contrast to unsecured lending to businesses,55 lenders in the
consumer context are increasingly willing to offer unsecured loans to risky
borrowers.56 Indeed, especially when compared to a generation ago, when
loan officers met in person with potential borrowers, modern day credit card
solicitations seem completely irrational, targeting those who have recently
filed for bankruptcy,57 high school students,58 and family pets.59
47
As of 2000, 76 percent of American households had at least one credit card. MANNING, supra note 44, at
6 n.11 (This figure refers to "bank" or all-purpose credit cards.) Manning also notes that the average number of
cards per cardholder is ten (including bank, retail, phone, gasoline and travel and entertainment cards). Id. at 6.
See also Bar-Gill, supra note 44, at 1384 (stating, on the basis of a 1995 study, that 80% of American households
have at least one credit card).
48
SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 110-111.
49
Id.
50
Shockingly, the average credit card debt per individual is $12,500. Bar-Gill, supra, note 44, at 1385.
51
Obviously, renters cannot mortgage their homes, but as of 2004, 69% of Americans owned their homes.
U.S. Census Bureau, Housing Vacancies and Homeownership,
Annual Statistics: 2004,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/annual04/ann04t12.html.
Banks can certainly favor such
borrowers or require some form of collateral in lieu of a home.
52
In contrast, as recent studies show, the decision by borrowers to choose credit card borrowing over
secured borrowing is rational despite the legal disadvantages to the borrower. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Credit
Card Policy in a Globalized World, Law and Economics Working Paper No. 018 (2004), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=509063; Bar-Gill, supra note 44; Laurie A. Lucas, Integrative Social Contracts Theory: Ethical
Implications of Marketing Credit Cards to U.S. College Students, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 413 (2001); Todd J. Zywicki,
The Economics of Credit Cards, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 79 (2000); KLEIN, supra note 44; MEDOFF & HARLESS, supra
note 44; LEWIS MANDELL, THE CREDIT CARD INDUSTRY: A HISTORY (1990).
53
The list includes major national banks. See MANNING, supra note 44, at 95 ("[T]he most distinguishing
feature of the credit card industry is its recent concentration. . . . Today, the top ten card issuers control nearly 77
percent of the card market and 69 percent of the $1.2 trillion in 1999 charge volume. . . . Indeed, industry mergers
and acquisitions have reduced the number of major corporate players and thus contributed to the costly increase in
consumer banking services in general . . . and credit card finance charges and fees in particular.").
54
Delinquency on Consumer Loans: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Banking and Fin. Services, 104th
Cong. (1996) (statement of Eugene A. Ludwig, Comptroller of the Currency), available at 1996 WL 520181).
See, e.g., Nordstrom Bank Homepage, http://about.nordstrom.com/aboutus/credit/credit.asp?origin=footer.
55
Professor Mann’s empirical work has helped to explain the puzzle of unsecured lending to businesses.
Mann, Explaining the Pattern, supra note 6.
56
SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 135-136; Robinson & Healy, supra note 42.
57
SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 322 n.47.
58
Id. at 137.
59
Id. at 322 n.90 (“During the hearings of the National Bankruptcy Review Commission on consumer
bankruptcy, one of the commissioners noted that his dog Bradley had recently received a credit application.”).

HUMAN WORTH AS COLLATERAL

11

Why do credit card companies do it? Gains from high interest rates,
various penalty fees and sheer volume all play important roles.60 But in my
view, the critical factor is the creation of a new kind of collateral out of a
system, namely credit reporting, that originally was intended for a quite
different purpose, namely as a means of solving information asymmetries.61
I argue that credit card lenders are using human worth as an extremely
valuable form of collateral, but that the law has not yet recognized this new
collateralization.

1. Collateralization through the mechanism of credit reporting
The mechanism by which credit card lenders have been able to
collateralize human worth is credit reporting. As described by the Fair
Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), the federal statute that governs credit
reporting, it is "[a]n elaborate mechanism … for investigating and
evaluating the credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character,
and general reputation of consumers."62 Credit reporting is used by, among
others, the "banking system,"63 lenders in the context of considering
applications for home and personal loans, potential employers, insurance
agencies, and anyone else who "otherwise has a legitimate business need for
the information"64 Specifically, these institutions use credit reports to

60
Indeed, Professors Sullivan, Warren and Westbrook conclude that “delinquent card holders who pay high
interest [are] the most valued customers in the business.” Id. at 135.
61
115 Cong. Rec. 33408, 33408 (1969) (“With the growth of consumer credit, a vast credit reporting
industry has developed to supply credit information.”); Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the
Rational Borrower: Rationality, Behavioralism, and the Misguided "Reform" of Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEX. L. R.
1481, 1514 (2006) (“In sum, credit scoring models have reduced the informational asymmetries between
borrowers and lenders who are complete strangers to each other.”).
62
15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(2) (2005).
63
"Inaccurate credit reports directly impair the efficiency of the banking system, and unfair credit reporting
methods undermine the public confidence which is essential to the continued functioning of the banking system."
15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1) (2005).
64
15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(F) (2005). In its entirety, § 1681b(a) states: In general
Subject to subsection (c) of this section, any consumer reporting agency may furnish a consumer report under
the following circumstances and no other:
(1) In response to the order of a court having jurisdiction to issue such an order, or a subpoena issued in
connection with proceedings before a Federal grand jury.
(2) In accordance with the written instructions of the consumer to whom it relates.
(3) To a person which it has reason to believe-(A) intends to use the information in connection with a credit transaction involving the consumer on whom
the information is to be furnished and involving the extension of credit to, or review or collection of an
account of, the consumer; or
(B) intends to use the information for employment purposes; or
(C) intends to use the information in connection with the underwriting of insurance involving the
consumer; or
(D) intends to use the information in connection with a determination of the consumer's eligibility for a
license or other benefit granted by a governmental instrumentality required by law to consider an
applicant's financial responsibility or status; or
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determine whether or not to transact business with (most prominently in the
form of issuing credit to) individuals.
The "system" consists rather simply of a "consumer report,"65 defined
by the Act as "any written, oral, or other communication of any information
by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer's credit worthiness,
credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal
characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to be used or
collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in
establishing the consumer's eligibility" for credit, insurance and the other
purposes stated in the Act.66 While the statutory definition of a credit report
is quite broad, the typical credit report is a simple document, essentially a
list of debts (including credit cards, student loans and mortgage loans) and
similar financial obligations of an individual, and a record of the
individual's timeliness in meeting those obligations,67 over a certain period
of time.68 A new industry of credit reporting agencies69 has developed to
create and maintain these reports.70 These agencies regularly receive
information necessary to compile credit reports from an individual's
creditors,71 and, when requested by a potential creditor (or other interested
party as defined by the FCRA), provide that information to potential
(E) intends to use the information, as a potential investor or servicer, or current insurer, in connection with
a valuation of, or an assessment of the credit or prepayment risks associated with, an existing credit
obligation; or
(F) otherwise has a legitimate business need for the information-(i) in connection with a business transaction that is initiated by the consumer; or
(ii) to review an account to determine whether the consumer continues to meet the terms of the account.
65
Throughout this article, I use the terms "consumer report" and "credit report" interchangeably.
66
15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1) (2005).
67
The three major credit reporting agencies define a credit report as follows. "A report that a prospective
lender or employer obtains from a consumer reporting agency that displays the manner in which a consumer has
met his or her past credit obligations. It is used to help determine creditworthiness of the potential borrower."
Equifax,
Equifax
Learning
Center,
Glossary
of
Terms,
Credit
report,
https://www.econsumer.equifax.com/consumer/sitepage.ehtml?forward=elearning_glossary#letterc. "Your credit
report is divided into six main sections: consumer information (address, birthday and employment), consumer
statement, account histories, public records, inquiries and creditor contacts. When you open a new account, miss a
payment or move, these sections are updated with new information." TransUnion, TrueCredit, Credit reporting
101, Your credit report, http://www.truecredit.com/help/learnCenter/creditBasics/creditReporting101.jsp. "Your
personal credit report contains: Federal district bankruptcy records and state and county court records of tax liens
and monetary judgments. This information comes from public records. Specific information about each account,
such as the date opened, credit limit or loan amount, balance, monthly payment and payment pattern during the
past several years. This information comes from companies that do business with you." [The other categories
listed by Experian are: personal data, inquiries, and statements of disputes by consumer and creditors.] Experian,
Credit
report
basic
FAQs,
What
information
is
included
in
my
credit
report?,
http://www.experian.com/consumer/credit_report_faqs.html.
68
Generally, adverse information may appear on a consumer credit report for no more than seven years. See
15 U.S.C. § 1681(c) (2005). In the case of Chapter 11 bankruptcy, adverse information may be reported for ten
years. Id.
69
I use the terms "credit reporting agencies," "consumer reporting agencies" and CRAs interchangeably.
70
"Consumer reporting agencies have assumed a vital role in assembling and evaluating consumer credit and
other information on consumers." 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3) (2005). There are three large national credit reporting
agencies (CRAs), often referred to as “The Big 3”: Equifax, Experian and TransUnion.
71
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(2005).
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creditors.72
The original purpose of credit reporting was to provide information
about consumer borrowers to banks who were not located in the borrowers’
neighborhoods (indeed, they often were in other states) and thus did not
know the borrowers’ reputations.73 These banks needed a substitute for
local loan officers who could track down reputational information by
talking to employers, neighbors, and others who knew their borrowers more
intimately.74 Credit reports filled the need, substituting credit scores for
loan officers’ assessments.75 In so doing, credit reporting allowed the
banking system to nationalize; it is now typical for banks to loan money by
means of credit cards to consumers across the country rather than just in the
state in which the banks are located.76 Without question, credit reports
solve information asymmetries, immeasurably increasing the ease with
which lenders can determine the creditworthiness of individuals, and
lowering the costs of doing so.77 Thus, what we should see is more careful
and accurate underwriting, albeit to a broader range of borrowers.
What we see instead is lenders sending solicitations to family pets. I
posit that this trend is partially explained by the fact that credit reports serve
a second function more powerful than information transmission about
borrower creditworthiness. They also constrain borrower behavior so
successfully that they effectively create a form of collateral that is capable
of liquidation. This additional function grows directly out of the
information gathering function of credit reports. As I have described, the
nationalizing market for credit demanded a system that could provide
information about any individual in the country at a low cost. The triumph
of credit reports in solving informational asymmetries is in their “universal
coverage” of all consumer loan transactions in the country.78 Through a
combination of public records and extensive private reporting from lenders
72

15 U.S.C. § 1681b(2005).
Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 61, at 1509.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 1509-14.
76
Id. See also Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine And Its
Effect On Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518, 540-556 (2004).
77
The ease of access to information contained in credit reports serves to lower overall transaction costs to
lenders -- a benefit which is theoretically passed on to consumers in the form of lower interest rates and more
available credit. As described by former Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Alan Greenspan: “[W]ithout the information that comes from various credit bureaus and other sources, lenders
would have to impose an additional risk premium because of the uncertainty before they make such loans or may,
indeed, choose not to make loans at all. So it is clearly in the interest of consumers to have information flowing
continuously into these markets. It keeps credit available to everybody, including the most marginal buyers. It
keeps interest rates lower than they would otherwise be because the uncertainties which would be required
otherwise would not be there.” Remarks following testimony by Alan Greenspan, April 30, 2003, House
Financial Services Committee.
78
Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 61, at 1511.
73
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and other creditors,79 credit reporting agencies can provide comprehensive,
accurate,80 and succinct information about consumers’ borrowing
behavior.81 Indeed, in the case of the credit market, the system works so
well that it is rare for lenders not to order credit reports about prospective
borrowers. Thus, a potential borrower has very little ability to prove her
character to a bank other than to ensure that this list of financial obligations
is generally positive.82
The result is that credit reports have effectively monopolized the market
for information about borrower behavior. The omnipresence of the credit
reporting system is the key to its power as a mechanism for behavior
modification. Because lenders rely so heavily on credit scores in making
underwriting decisions, a bad credit score has significant consequences.
Certainly, such consequences can include the loss of an opportunity to buy a
home, rent an apartment, or receive a loan.83 When an individual uses her
personal credit history to support her business enterprise, as in the case of
providing a personal guaranty for a business loan, such consequences can
extend even further. It seems fair to say that a good credit score is often
essential to an individual's ability to generate wealth, be it from
employment, credit, or ownership of assets.
Moreover, studies of credit card use find a strong link between credit
cards and the purchase of both basic and "luxury"84 consumer goods and
79

See supra note 67.
I use the term “accurate” here to describe completeness of information rather than accuracy in predicting
how creditworthy an individual is. There is much evidence, however, that this information is also quite useful for
the latter purpose. See Robert B. Avery, et al., Credit Report Accuracy and Access to Credit, FEDERAL RESERVE
BULLETIN 297 (2004) (“[F]actors … used in credit scoring models are the ones proven statistically to be the most
valid predictors of future credit performance.”). See also Gary G. Chandler & Lee E. Parker, Predictive Value of
Credit Bureau Reports, 4 JOURNAL OF RETAIL BANKING 47 (1989). Of the factors most commonly employed in
assessing a consumer’s credit risk, past payment history is traditionally given the greatest proportional weight,
reflecting the assumption that past behavior is indicative of future performance. Fair Isaac Corporation, What’s In
Your Score, www.myfico.com.
81
CRAs report on other behavior too, but I am focusing here on borrowing.
82
The consequences described by plaintiffs in FCRA cases provides ample evidence of the importance of
credit reports in obtaining loans, credit cards and other commercial opportunities. In Stevenson v. TRW Inc., 987
F.2d 288, 297 (5th Cir. 1993), for example, plaintiff was "was denied credit three times during TRW's
reinvestigation: by Bloomingdale's, by Bank One, and by Gabbert's Furniture Company" and ultimately had to
seek credit from a bank whose president was a friend (and thus could review the plaintiff's creditworthiness more
holistically). See also Thompson v. San Antonio Retail Merchants Ass'n, 682 F.2d 509, 514 (5th Cir. 1982)
(plaintiff denied credit three times due to negative credit report); Millstone v. O'Hanlon Reports, Inc., 528 F.2d
829, 834-35 (8th Cir.1976) (plaintiff was refused insurance on grounds of negative credit report); Boris v.
Choicepoint Services, Inc., 249 F. Supp.2d 851, 855 (W.D. Ky. 2003) (same). These cases are representative of
the innumerable occasions when consumers are denied credit on the basis of a negative report.
83
See, e.g. Getting Credit: What You Need to Know About Your Credit, Federal Trade Commission
Publication, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/credit/gettingcredit.htm (“Bad credit ... means that you might
have trouble getting a car loan, a credit card, a place to live and, sometimes, a job.”); Roger D. Blair & Virginia
Maurer, Statute and the Common Law: The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 49 MO. L. REV. 289, 295 (1984) (A
negative credit report “may result in an inability to obtain credit, employment, or insurance.”). See also JOHN R.
VACCA, IDENTITY THEFT 8-9 (2003).
84
I use the term "luxury" to distinguish these goods from those that implicate survival, but, as the list below
80
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services. Goods in the first category include groceries,85 tuition,86 and
clothing.87 These are the kinds of things purchased by credit card users who
do not have the resources to make ends meet month to month.88 Goods in
the second category include fitness club memberships, restaurant meals, and
vacations.89 These are the kinds of things that contribute to middle class
lifestyle and status. Because many people pursue lifestyles for which they
cannot afford to pay with their income alone, they need credit to buy statusenhancers.90 In other words, an individual with bad credit loses the things
that are important to both her economic and social status.91
It is understandable, therefore, that borrowers go to great lengths to pay
their credit card and other unsecured debts voluntarily, despite the arguable
irrationality of paying fees so exorbitant that they regularly result in
negative amortization.92 It is also predictable that most Americans regulate
their own behavior in ways that maximize their credit scores. Such
regulation certainly includes taking fewer risks (which I will call
constraining behavior), but it also includes incurring debts that may be seen
as improving one's credit score (which I will call shaping behavior).93
Thus, while the law recognizes and regulates the information
transmission function of credit reports, the credit card industry has begun to
capitalize on the connection between credit and status. From its marketing
tactics, it appears that the industry no longer relies on the information
suggests, they are often not extravagant.
85
Peter Lucas, Letting the Numbers Tell the Story, 11 TECHNOLOGY, at 36; Elizabeth Dunne Schmitt, Does
Rising Consumer Debt Signal Future Recessions?, 28 ATLANTIC ECON. J., at 333; Paul Lim et al., Digging Your
Way Out of Debt, 130 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., at 52.
86
SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 138.
87
Id. at 111.
88
See Lucas, supra note 85 at 36. But see Todd Zywicki, An Economic Analysis of the Consumer
Bankruptcy Crisis, 99 NORTHWESTERN UNIV. L. R. 1463, 1494 (2005) (acknowledging the increase in credit card
debt of lower-income borrowers, but arguing that such debt does not increase their overall debt burden because it
substitutes for debt to pawnbrokers, rent-to-own retailers and the like).
89
Lim, supra note 85, at 52.
90
Id. at 52.
91
Indeed, there appears to be a growing trend of using credit reports as a proxy for screening and decisionmaking processes outside the context of credit transactions, and in contexts where character was once assessed in
a more holistic manner. For instance, some relationship experts now recommend using credit reports to evaluate
the trustworthiness and suitability of a potential romantic partner, while some businesses forego the interview
screening process entirely in favor of the information about an individual that may be gleaned from a credit report.
See Stacy A. Teicher, Judged by the Content of Your Credit Report, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, March 1,
2004.
92
A recent news report defines negative amortization on credit card debt as a circumstance where “an
individual's debt continues to grow even though she is making payments on it.” Kathleen Day & Caroline E.
Mayer,
Credit
Card
Penalties,
Fees
Bury
Debtors,
Washingtonpost.com,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A10361-2005Mar5?language=printer.
93
The Fair Isaac Corporation, creator of the FICO scores used widely in credit reports, recommends the
following for those managing new credit: “In general, having credit cards and installment loans (and paying
timely payments) will raise your score. Someone with no credit cards, for example, tends to be higher risk than
someone who has managed credit cards responsibly.” The Fair Isaac Corporation, MyFico, Improving Your
FICO Score, http://www.myfico.com/CreditEducation/ImproveYourScore.aspx.

16

Rashmi Dyal-Chand

provided by credit scores as a means to screen borrowers. Instead, the
industry uses credit scores as a threat by taking advantage of their
tremendous importance to American consumers. The result is a cycle of
increasing debt, accompanied by more powerful behavior control: Credit
card lenders offer credit extensively with the knowledge that people use
credit to enhance their status and wealth. People take on more credit card
debt, thereby accepting the behavioral constraints that are required to
maintain a good credit score. And the self-regulation required to maintain a
good credit score frees the industry to offer even more credit at costs that
are extremely low because the need for careful screening no longer exists.
It could be argued that, to the extent credit card lenders are
collateralizing something, it is the lost consumer goods, insurance and
employment that serve as collateral. Common experience suggests,
however, that something deeper is lost. Consider the awkwardness of
having to pay cash for an expensive pair of shoes. Or of trying to rent a car
without a credit card. Indeed, while this new collateralization clearly
implicates reputational concerns,94 it appears to go deeper, as I will discuss
in greater detail in Part III.
As plaintiffs' testimony in lawsuits against credit bureaus for negligent
maintenance of credit reports shows, the real loss to consumers does not
seem to be the loss of goods but rather the loss of face. Plaintiffs describe
feelings of "humiliation,"95 “considerable embarrassment,"96 "terrific
shock,"97 and “loss of reputation."98 Courts have broadly recognized the
harm to a plaintiff claiming a FCRA violation, by allowing damages for
emotional distress in addition to the actual damages proven by plaintiffs.99
94
On this point, see James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty, 113
YALE L. J. 1151 (2004).
95
See, e.g., Morris, 563 F. Supp. at 967; Cousin v. TransUnion Corp., 246 F.3d 359, 369 n.15 (5th Cir.
2001); Boris v. Choicepoint Services, Inc., 249 F. Supp.2d 851, 860 (W.D. Ky. 2003); Collins v. Retain Credit
Company, 410 F. Supp. 924, 932 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
96
Stevenson, 987 F.2d at 297.
97
Id.
98
Dalton v. Capital Associated Industries, Inc., 257 F.3d 409, 418 (4th Cir. 2001).
99
See Cousin v. TransUnion Corp., 246 F.3d 359, 369 n.15 (5th Cir. 2001) (actual damages, as provided for
in 15 U.S.C. § 1681o, “may include damages for humiliation or emotional distress even if the consumer has
suffered no out-of-pocket losses, as well as damages for injury to reputation and creditworthiness”), citing Fischl
v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 708 F.2d 143 (5th Cir 1983); Dalton, 257 F.3d at 418 (recognizing that
damages for “emotional distress and loss of reputation” may be awarded for the circulation of false information
contained within a credit report, even where the false information itself did not cause direct adverse employment
consequences to the plaintiff); Stevenson, 987 F.2d at 297 (plaintiff awarded damages after experiencing “terrific
shock” and “considerable embarrassment” upon erroneously receiving a bad credit rating); Bryant v. TRW, Inc.,
487 F. Supp. 1234, 1242-43 (E.D. Mich. 1980), aff’d, 689 F.2d 72 (6th Cir. 1982) (plaintiff awarded damages for
mental anguish, embarrassment and humiliation after a credit reporting agency furnished inaccurate mortgage
reports pertaining to plaintiff); Millstone v. O’Hanlon Reports, 528 F.2d 829, 834 (8th Cir. 1976); (where a credit
reporting agency willfully reported false negative information in violation of the FCRA, damages for mental
anguish are appropriate); Boris v. Choicepoint Services, Inc., 249 F. Supp.2d 851, 860-861 (W.D. Ky. 2003)
(plaintiff awarded damages for “humiliation, mental distress and embarrassment” after a credit reporting agency
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In summary, what began as a by-product of information transmission
has resulted in a remarkable transformation in the availability of consumer
credit. Some time between 1950, when credit card debt meant buying a
washing machine on credit from Sears,100 and now, when credit card
solicitations offer literally hundreds of thousands of dollars in credit per
year to every American household,101 credit became easy to come by
without proof of any financial basis for repayment. Whether accidentally or
not, credit card lenders now use credit reports for a purpose much more
powerful than screening borrowers. They use credit reports to collateralize
human worth.102
2. Human worth as collateral
There is nothing new or surprising about this description of the power of
credit scores. But because the law draws such a bright line between secured
and unsecured credit, it may seem surprising that, by constraining behavior
so well, the credit reporting system effectively creates collateral. The
purpose of this section, therefore, is to compare the credit reporting system's
use of human worth as collateral against the features of collateral
established in the literature on secured lending. As I will show, consumer
circulated a credit report containing inaccurate insurance claim information); Collins v. Retain Credit Company.,
410 F. Supp. 924, 932 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (plaintiff awarded damages for “loss of reputation, embarrassment and
humiliation” after being denied auto insurance on the basis of statements in her credit report “regarding her
alleged excessive drinking habits and alleged instances of low moral character”); Morris v. Credit Bureau of
Cincinnati, 563 F. Supp. 962, 969 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (where credit reporting agency reported erroneous
information about plaintiff’s credit, plaintiff was entitled to damages for the “significant injury to his reputation,
his family, his work and his sense of well-being as a proximate result of defendant's negligent failure to comply
with the FCRA”).
100
SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 44, at 109.
101
Id. at 109.
102
It is important to note that, from an economic perspective, the collateralization of human worth does in
fact solve information asymmetries. It does so by substituting collateral for information. For discussions of the
ways in which collateral solves information problems in imperfect markets, see Mann, Explaining the Pattern,
supra note 6, at 638 ("[T]he advantages that a lender receives from a grant of collateral can lower the lender's
anticipated overall costs and thus indirectly lower the costs that the borrower must pay to induce the lender to
make the loan."); Hylton, supra note 17, at 214 (collateral aligns borrower and lender incentives, which in turn
mitigates the problem of “moral hazard”, i.e. the tendency of borrowers to fail to maximize the probability of loan
repayment); Lan Cao, Looking at Communities and Markets, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 841, 852, 856-857 (1999)
(absence of collateral increases transaction costs and can result in “rational redlining”, i.e., “those who need
money the most are those who can borrow the least”); Jameel Jaffer, Microfinance And The Mechanics Of
Solidarity Lending: Improving Access To Credit Through Innovations In Contract Structure, 9 J. TRANSNAT'L L.
& POL'Y 183, 189 (1999) (“[C]ollateral can often compensate for some of the gap in information between lender
and borrower, providing a way to both increase the borrower’s stake in the success of the project and reduce
losses to the bank in the event of a default.”); WILLIAM SIMON, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
MOVEMENT: LAW, BUSINESS & THE NEW SOCIAL POLICY 44-45 (2001) ("To the extent that an applicant can post
assets as security for loan commitments, the lender has less need to rely on assessments of her reliability. Assets
perform an informational role, as well. An applicant who puts her own assets at risk by investing in a house or
business or in training that fits her for particular jobs signals to others the seriousness of her belief that the
investment is a sound one and her intention to act to make it work. Poor people are less able to substantiate their
commitments in this way.").
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lenders are using human worth in a way that closely approximates the
prototypical use of collateral. Again, my point in analyzing human worth as
collateral is not to challenge the distinction between secured and unsecured
lending.103 Rather, my point is that lenders have discovered a new form of
leverage in a world where credit is extremely important to status and
wealth. In order to emphasize the economic value to lenders of this new
leverage, I describe it as collateral. But whether the leverage actually
constitutes collateral or is a substitute for collateral is, for my purposes, less
important than that the law fails to recognize it more than in passing.104

a. Quantifiable
As described in Part I, in order for something to serve as collateral, it
must be quantifiable. If human worth is to serve as collateral, it must have a
value that can be compared among different "owners" of this asset, thereby
allowing a lender both to choose among borrowers and to establish loan
terms that will sufficiently protect the lender's interests. In the consumer
credit context, one means of quantification is an individual's credit score.
Lenders do in fact use this score to make underwriting decisions. As I have
discussed, because credit scores link so extensively to economic and social
opportunities, they directly implicate human worth. Moreover, as FCRA
lawsuits demonstrate, a good credit score itself is now something about
which to be proud, and a bad credit score is something about which to be
ashamed.105 In this sense, pride and shame are calibrated by means of credit
scores.106
b. Capable of liquidation
For the purposes both of motivating the borrower to repay voluntarily
and providing a means of collecting cash upon foreclosure or repossession,
collateral also must be capable of liquidation. In the consumer context, the
connection between credit reports, credit, and social status provides a means
of liquidating a person's sense of honor. Simply put, by reporting negative
information to a credit bureau, a lender can limit a borrower's acquisition of
status-enhancing goods and services, and more basically, lower her social
103
Nonetheless, a few prominent scholars have recognized that the line is arguably more formal than
operational, and more important in the law than in transactional behavior. See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 7, at
1926.
104
It is, of course, of great pragmatic importance ultimately to determine whether the law should treat this
new leverage as collateral or as something else.
105
See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
106
It could also be said that the money damages for emotional distress that plaintiffs have received for
violations of the FCRA are a means of quantifying human worth in this context.
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standing. Here too, the FCRA lawsuits provide powerful evidence that
people who lose credit or employment opportunities, or who simply are
publicly perceived as having bad credit suffer a diminution of human worth.
Credit card companies can and do control the potential for liquidation by
providing credit bureaus with information about defaults. In this way,
credit bureaus can diminish a person’s sense of self worth.
c. Capable of appreciation
When collateral has the potential to appreciate over time, it is generally
more attractive to a lender. As I have discussed, American consumers can
modify their purchasing habits to increase their credit scores.107 In this
respect, we can manage this particular asset's appreciation in value.
Appreciation is useful to credit card lenders in the traditional respects, for
example by raising the stakes more for borrowers so that they will limit
their risky behavior. But this particular means of causing appreciation is
also quite useful because it encourages borrowers to borrow even more than
they would if incentivized differently.
d. Meaningful to borrower
To ensure voluntary repayment and constrain behavior, collateral should
be meaningful to the borrower. Obviously, by collateralizing human worth,
lenders have found a means by which to access something even more
meaningful than a home or a wedding ring. They have found a way to
constrain borrowers’ ability to obtain future credit, status enhancing goods
and services, and wealth. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a more
meaningful asset.
e. Easy to monitor
Collateral that is easy to monitor is attractive to lenders because it
reduces the cost of lending. The ease with which information is transmitted
in the credit reporting system makes human worth as collateral extremely
easy to monitor. By reviewing the patterns and details of payments and
defaults, lenders can use credit reports to predict the extent to which an
individual pegs her honor on her credit score. Thus, by capturing a sense of
human worth in credit scores, lenders are able to monitor the collateral quite
efficiently.
f. Transferable
107

See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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An important distinction between human worth as collateral and other
forms of collateral is that human worth cannot be repossessed and sold for
cash. Given the importance of repossession to the traditional theory of
secured lending, this distinction is a strong rejoinder to my hypothesis that
lenders are using human worth as collateral. As recent empirical
scholarship details, however, lenders regularly take security interests in
software and other intellectual property which cannot practically be
repossessed.108 These things are nonetheless recognized by the law as
collateral, lending support to the idea that modern-day secured lending, if
economically rational, provides important benefits other than serving as a
means of payment collection.
3. Law's Irrelevance
Although I am confident that the phenomenon I have identified as the
collateralization of human worth exists, I want to be clear that, at present,
my analysis of what caused this phenomenon is merely an untested
hypothesis. The purpose of this sub-section and of Part II.B.3 is to suggest
that the law was largely irrelevant to the creation of this new collateral; the
purpose of Part IV is to suggest that the globalizing credit market was the
driving force. I hope that others will find analogs in their own work that
will help to test the more exploratory parts of this analysis.
Before considering the extent to which the law fails to recognize credit
card lenders’ use of human worth, it might be useful to consider how the
law could have recognized this new use. One possibility would simply be a
statutory or judicial recognition that Article 9 intangibles can include
concepts of self worth, which as I discuss below, are not extraordinarily
different from good will. Another would be for the FCRA explicitly to
recognize that human dignity is at stake in modern lending practices and to
protect consumers from over-reaching by lenders in their use of this new
collateral. My preliminary review, however, shows at most marginal legal
recognition of human worth’s new market value.
a. Article 9 intangibles
Even though human worth, as used by credit card lenders, has many of
the features of collateral, secured transactions law fails entirely to recognize
108

Mann, Software Financing, supra note 9. Lack of transferability is arguably a problem for all nonphysical collateral. In this context, though, the inability to obtain future credit is arguably a form of repossession,
a point which I am grateful to Professor Hillinger for sharing.
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human worth as collateral. The reason cannot be lack of specificity.109 On
the one hand, as we have seen, credit reporting provides a very specific
means of quantifying human worth.110 On the other, the law permits
collateralization of things as intangible as intellectual property and good
will,111 among other “general intangibles.”112 Even in the consumer
context,113 “things in action,”114 so long as they are specifically enough
described,115 can be collateralized.116
Qualitatively, good will and things in action might be the most similar
to human worth. The former signifies notions of name recognition and
customer loyalty, but traditionally it has been an asset of businesses rather
than individuals. 117 The latter includes torts,118 though it is unclear whether
a tort based on violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act has ever actually
been claimed as collateral. However, neither of these categories captures
credit card lenders’ extensive use of human worth itself as the basis for
managing borrower behavior, incentivizing voluntary repayments, and
reducing lender costs.
A useful analogy to the possible legal recognition of human worth as
collateral is real estate law’s historical protection of borrowers who
mortgage their homes.119 Rights of redemption,120 voiding of contract
109
Perhaps the law’s failure here is due in part to its abhorrence of anything that implicates involuntary
servitude.
110
See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
111
See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
112
U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42) (2005) (“’General intangible’ means any personal property, including things in
action, other than accounts, chattel paper, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, documents, goods,
instruments, investment property, letter-of-credit rights, letters of credit, money, and oil, gas, or other minerals
before extraction. The term includes payment intangibles and software.”).
113
I base this conclusion on the fact that Article 9 does not exclude “things in action” from the list of things
that consumers can collateralize.
114
I.e., rights that can be recovered by a law suit. 63 Am. Jur. 2d Property § 22 (1997).
115
See supra note 29.
116
U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42) (2005).
117
See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 2:19 (4th ed.
2002) (defining goodwill as "the intangible value of a business beyond the value of its physical assets"); Metro.
Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 149 U.S. 436, 446 (1888) (defining good will as “the advantage or benefit, which
is acquired by an establishment, beyond the mere value of the capital stock, funds or property employed therein,
in consequence of the general public patronage and encouragement which it receives from constant or habitual
customers, on account of its local position, or common celebrity, or reputation, for skill or affluence, or
punctuality, or from other practical circumstances, or necessities, or even from ancient partialities or prejudices.”).
118
Lars S. Smith, General Intangible or Commercial Tort: Moral Rights and State-Based Intellectual
Property as Collateral under U.C.C. Revised Article 9, 22 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 95, 108 (2005). “Things in
action” do not include commercial torts, however. Id.
119
For a discussion of consumer protections in real estate law, see Rashmi Dyal-Chand, From Status to
Contract: Evolving Paradigms for Regulating Consumer Credit, __ TENN. L. REV __ (forthcoming 2006)
(manuscript on file with author).
120
For discussions of the equity of redemption, see NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, at §3.1; GEORGE E.
OSBORNE, MORTGAGES, 13 (2d. ed. 1970); Morris G. Shanker, Will Mortgage Law Survive?: A Commentary and
Critique on Mortgage Law’s Birth, Long Life, and Current Proposals for Its Demise, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 69
(2003); Marshall E. Tract, Renegotiation and Secured Credit: Explaining the Equity of Redemption, 52 VAND. L.
REV. 599 (1999). For discussions of the statutory right of redemption, see NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, at
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language, 121 and use of parol evidence122 all arguably recognize the unique
feelings of attachment to one’s home, an attachment that Margaret Jane
Radin describes as embodying personhood.123 Qualitatively, the ways in
which mortgage lenders rely on borrowers’ attachment to their homes to
manage borrower behavior is very similar to the ways in which credit card
lenders rely on human worth. What distinguishes the two, however, is that
in the former context, the physical home is still the explicit collateral,
whereas in the latter, there is no physical collateral at all and yet lenders
receive many of the same benefits as they do from taking security interests.
b. Judgments, executions, and bill collectors
When credit card lenders seek legal remedies for defaults by borrowers,
they generally do not have the right to collect payment by means of
repossession. In other words, the law considers them to be unsecured
creditors who must reduce their claims to judgments in order to acquire a
property interest in the borrower’s assets. It should come as no surprise that
in these lawsuits, a vast number of which are decided by arbitration,124 there
is also no recognition of human worth as collateral. Instead, courts and
arbitrators focus on contractual language concerning such matters as
arbitration rights,125 and fees and penalties.126 Thus, for example, in
Arriaga v. Cross Country Bank,127 the court refused to void an arbitration
clause in the plaintiff's credit card contract despite her claim that she did not
contest the clause because to do so would risk negative information on her
credit report. In other words, the court did not recognize that the lender was
using the borrower's human worth to constrain her behavior.
Credit card lenders, on the other hand, do seem to recognize the power
of shaming their borrowers, though they may not explicitly describe it as
such. Their shaming takes the form of aggressive and targeted bill
collection techniques such as car repossessions128 and small claims
689-706; KORNGOLD & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 24, at 492-3; James B. Hughes, Jr., Taking Personal
Responsibility: A Different View of Mortgage Antideficiency and Redemption Statutes, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 117
(1997).
121
See, e.g., McElroy v. Grisham, 810 S.W.2d 933 (Ark. 1991); Shadman v. O'Brien, 180 N.E. 532 (Mass.
1932); Scheibe v. Kennedy, 25 N.W. 646 (Wis. 1885); Campbell v. Dearborn, 109 Mass. 130, 12 Am.Rep. 671
(1872). See also OSBORNE, supra note 120, at 116; NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 8, at 58.
122
See, e.g., Pierce v. Robinson, 13 Cal. 116, 125 (1859).
123
Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 25, at 991-992.
124
See Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is it Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631 (2005).
125
See, e.g., Taylor v. First North American National Bank, 325 F.Supp.2d 1304 (M.D. Ala. 2004); Arriaga
v. Cross Country Bank, 163 F.Supp.2d 1189 (S.D. Cal. 2001); Bank One, N.A. v. Coates, 125 F.Supp.2d 819
(S.D. Miss. 2001); Edelist v. MBNA America Bank, 790 A.2d 1249 (Del. Super. 2001).
126
See, e.g., Morris v. Redwood Empire Bancorp, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 797 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
127
163 F.Supp.2d 1189 (S.D. Cal. 2001).
128
See generally Michael Rezendes & Francie Latour, No Mercy for Consumers: Firms’ Tactics are One
Mark of System that Penalizes those who Owe,
BOSTON GLOBE, August 1, 2006,
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lawsuits.129
Perhaps the greatest recognition that human worth is at stake in the
credit card lending context is the awards of damages for emotional distress
suffered by plaintiffs alleging violations of the FCRA. Although these
cases recognize the shame suffered by plaintiffs, by focusing on the
negligent behavior of the credit bureaus they do not typically recognize the
important role played by lenders in manipulating human worth. This failure
is particularly interesting in light of the fact that the legislative history
references the dissemination by credit bureaus of “highly sensitive and
personal information” about a person’s “general character.” If this does not
implicate human worth, it is hard to imagine what does.
The FCRA seeks to protect consumers, however, by protecting their
privacy rather than their human worth.130
The greatest practical
consequence of this different focus is that the FCRA provides consumers
with the right to know what private information credit bureaus are sharing
with others, but it does not really limit the use of that information by credit
bureaus or lenders.131 It does not, for example, prohibit lenders from
threatening diminution of human worth under certain circumstances.132
Thus, the FCRA regulates the way in which credit reports transmit
information rather than the way in which they modify behavior. The
consequence in the US is that the law recognizes human worth as at most
marginally relevant. While the law recognizes the repercussions to
consumers’ rights of privacy, it does not recognize that the threat to
personal reputation, or to the ability to borrow in the future, can themselves
be potent forms of leverage.
B. Peer Lending
In a rural Bangladeshi village, the tale is told of a woman who, because
http://www.boston.com/news/special/spotlight_debt/part1/page1.html; Walter V. Robinson & Michael Rezendes,
Enforcers'
Might
Goes
Unchecked,
BOSTON
GLOBE,
August
1,
2006,
http://www.boston.com/news/special/spotlight_debt/part3/page1.html.
129
See generally Beth Healy, Dignity Faces a Steamroller: Small-Claims Proceedings Ignore Rights, Tilt to
Collectors, BOSTON GLOBE, July 30, 2006, http://www.boston.com/news/special/spotlight_debt/part2/page1.html.
130
The legislative history evidences the FCRA’s focus on privacy. See, e.g., 116 Cong. Rec. 35941, 35941
(1970) (“The purposes of the Fair Credit Reporting Act are to give consumers a chance to correct inaccurate
information in their credit file; to preserve the confidentiality of such information; and to prevent undue invasions
of the individual’s right to privacy.”).
131
Elsewhere, I discuss this distinction at greater length. Dyal-Chand, From Status to Contract, supra note
119.
132
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §1692 (2005), arguably does limit the most egregious
harassment by creditors, thus providing some circumstances in which the law protects borrower’s dignity. But
both because it limits only the worst behavior and because it applies to lender behavior after the initial choices
regarding collateralization are made, this statute provides little protection in the world of this new
collateralization.
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she was late in repaying her microloan from the Grameen Bank, was locked
in a bank branch by fellow borrowers who were acting as guarantors of her
loan.133 Faced with the loss of honor to her family as a result of her failure
to repay, she used her sari to hang herself from the ceiling fan.134
The Grameen Bank makes tiny loans to poor, landless people (primarily
women) in Bangladesh.135 The Bank's purpose in making these microloans
is to provide the poor with the capital to start their own microenterprises.136
Part of the Bank's attraction to its funding sources and many others is that it
presents itself as a "typical" commercial lender.137 Thus, when the Bank
began lending to the landless poor, it faced an immediate problem: the poor
have no physical collateral with which to secure their loans.138 They do,
however, have their honor. So the Bank substitutes honor as collateral. The
Bank is able to do this by means of an ingenious device called a solidarity
circle. The Bank requires borrowers, as a condition to receiving a loan, to
form groups of five.139 Each borrower within this circle must guaranty the
loans of the other circle members.140
Given the extraordinary poverty of its borrowers, the Bank must be
well-aware that they cannot actually pay each other's debts.141 Nonetheless,
133

AMINUR RAHMAN, WOMEN AND MICROCREDIT IN RURAL BANGLADESH 75-76 (1999).
Id. Rahman also found that the pressure to maintain the family's honor resulted in violence against
women in the family. Id. at 120-121 (In his study village, 57% of female borrowers reported an increase in
"verbal aggression" after joining the Bank and an additional 13% reported an increase in both "verbal aggression"
and "physical assault."). See also Celia Taylor, Microcredit as a Model: A Critique Of State/NGO Relations, 29
SYRACUSE J. OF INT’L L. & COM. 303, 327 (2002) ("[R]ather than 'empowering' poor women, loan circles can
deepen poor women's enmeshment in traditional relationships of domination.").
135
Grameen Bank Homepage, A short history of Grameen Bank, http://grameen-info.org/bank/hist.html;
Grameen Bank Homepage, Grameen Bank, http://grameen-info.org/bank/index.html; Grameen Bank Homepage,
Credit delivery system, http://grameen-info.org/bank/cds.html; ALEX COUNTS, GIVE US CREDIT xiii (1996) (the
loans are typically between twenty-five and seventy-five US dollars); DAVID BORNSTEIN, THE PRICE OF A DREAM
19, 26 (1996).
136
Grameen Bank Homepage, Credit delivery system, http://grameen-info.org/bank/cds.html.
137
BORNSTEIN, supra note 135, at 231. See also Philip M. Nichols, A Legal Theory Of Emerging
Economies, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 229, 299-300 (1999) (“Grameen Bank acts in many respects as a typical
commercial bank, albeit with a customer base consisting of the very poor of Bangladesh.”); Lewis D. Solomon,
Microenterprise: Human Reconstruction in America’s Inner Cities, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 191, 195 (1992)
(Grameen Bank is like a "typical commercial bank.").
138
Grameen Bank Homepage, Breaking the vicious cycle of poverty through microcredit, http://grameeninfo.org/bank/bcycle.html ("The Grameen Bank is based on the voluntary formation of small groups of five
people to provide mutual, morally binding group guarantees in lieu of the collateral required by conventional
banks."). See also Mohammad A. Auwal & Arvind Singhal, The Diffusion of Grameen Bank in Bangladesh:
Lessons Learned about Alleviating Rural Poverty, 14 KNOWLEDGE: CREATION, DIFFUSION, UTILIZATION 7, 16
(1992) (stating that peer lending "replac[es] material collateral with a kind of social collateral"); RAHMAN, supra
note 133, at 8 ("The pressure of the group acts as the collateral for the bank.").
139
Grameen Bank Homepage, Credit delivery system, http://grameen-info.org/bank/cds.html.
140
Grameen Bank Homepage, Breaking the vicious cycle of poverty through microcredit, http://grameeninfo.org/bank/bcycle.html; RAHMAN, supra note 133, at 78; BORNSTEIN, supra note 135, at 100.
141
See, e.g., RAHMAN, supra note 133, at 118 (describing the various sources of funds for repayment of
loans, and finding that only 3 percent of the time do borrowers borrow money from circle members in order to
repay loans); HELEN TODD, WOMEN AT THE CENTER : GRAMEEN BANK BORROWERS AFTER ONE DECADE 163167 (1996) (finding that circle members in her study area did at times help each other with repayment, but
134
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the system works shockingly well.142 Therein lies the mystery. Why does
the Bank accept guarantors who do not have the capacity to repay the
borrowers' loans?143 Some who have studied the Bank conclude that
borrowers have the necessary information about each other’s character,
business judgment and chances of success to be able to successfully
“screen” each other for loans.144 However, recent studies refute these
conclusions, finding that borrowers may have accurate information about
each other’s character, but not about their chances of business success.145
I propose a different reason. In their small, close-knit communities,
borrowers cannot default because doing so would risk extraordinary shame,
social degradation and even ostracism.146 The guaranty required by the
Bank is not realistically one of repayment by other solidarity circle
generally as a last resort, following resort to relatives, money lenders, and neighbors), and at 164 (quoting a
borrower: "[Circle members] do not help me with repayment. They should, but they have no more [money] than
me, so how can they?").
142
The Grameen Bank's website states that its repayment rate is 97%. Grameen Bank Homepage, Breaking
the vicious cycle of poverty through microcredit, http://www.grameen-info.org/bank/bcycle.html. This is much
higher than the average repayment rate of commercial banks in Bangladesh (and even of many US banks). Philip
M. Nichols, Swapping Debt for Development: A Theoretical Application of Swaps to The Creation of
Microenterprise Lending Institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa, 27 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 43, 67 (1994)
(comparing the Grameen Bank's 98% rate of repayment to the “commercial default rate in Bangladesh of seventy
to ninety percent”) (emphasis added).
143
While the Bank’s use of guarantors who cannot really act as guarantors is puzzling on its face, the high
repayment rates by borrowers is at least partially explained by their desire for repeat loans from the Bank.
Grameen Bank Homepage, Credit delivery system, http://grameen-info.org/bank/cds.html.
144
See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 396 (2003) ("[P]eer selection by
borrowers mitigates the huge information asymmetries inherent in underdeveloped credit markets. While
assessing the credit risks of Bangladeshi villagers would be prohibitively costly for a bank, the villagers
themselves are intimately acquainted with each other's honesty, financial status, and work ethic."); Jaffer, supra
note 102, at 202 ("Members of the group likely come from the same village, have known one another all their
lives, and are intimately familiar with one another’s financial situation.”); Jacob Yaron, What Makes Rural
Finance Institutions Successful?, 9 WORLD BANK RES. OBSERVER 49, 55 (1994) (“By leaving much of the
screening process in the hands of people who know the borrower very well, Grameen Bank decreases one element
of risk that faces most lenders: imperfect knowledge as to whether a borrower intends to default.”); Joseph E.
Stiglitz, Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets, 4 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 351, 353 (1990) ("[T]he Grameen
Bank is able to exploit the local knowledge of the members of the group. It has devised an incentive structure
whereby others within the village do the monitoring for it."); Solomon, supra note 133, at 198 ("Because group
members assume mutual responsibility for each others' loans, the Bank can reduce staff time devoted to tracking
loans and service more borrowers.").
145
See, e.g., Chi-kan Richard Hung, From South to North: Comparative Study of Microcredit Programs in
Developing Countries and US, in REPLICATING MICROFINANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 223, 248-251 (James H.
Carr & Zhong Yi Tong eds., 2002).
146
RAHMAN, supra note 133, at 73-75 (describing the detailed and genderized requirements for maintaining
honor in rural Bangladeshi society, with the heavier burden falling on women, and the extreme consequences that
can flow from the shame of loan default), at 75 (quoting a borrower: "'When a woman fails to make her
installments on time, she experiences humiliation through verbal aggression from peers and bank workers in the
loan center. Such humiliation of women in a public place gives males in the household and in the lineage a bad
reputation.'"), and at 76 ("The safeguard of iijat (women's honor) by men in the society . . . gives the lending
institution an unwritten guarantee of getting back regular installments from its women borrowers."); BORNSTEIN,
supra note 135, at 86 (quoting a borrower's husband as saying that "[i]f the bank lent money to men, . . . they
wouldn't get it back so conscientiously"); MUHAMMAD YUNUS, BANKER TO THE POOR: MICRO-LENDING AND
THE BATTLE AGAINST WORLD POVERTY 63-64 (1999) (describing the extraordinary fear the average borrower
experiences when she receives her first loan); Anne Marie Goetz & Rina Sen Gupta, Who Takes the Credit?
Gender, Power, and Control Over Loan Use in Rural Credit Programs in Bangladesh, 24 WORLD DEVELOPMENT
45, 61 (1996) (discussing the positional vulnerability of women in rural Bangladeshi society).
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members. It is that fellow members will shame the borrower into finding
whatever means she can to repay her debts.
Thus, while most refer to the solidarity circle as making use of "peer
pressure" to enforce loan terms,147 in fact the driving force behind that peer
pressure is something more ethereal.148 When borrowers and bank
managers consider prospective borrowers, they consider whether a person is
honorable – and whether she is capable of losing her honor if she fails to
repay her loan.149 When borrowers are interviewed about the consequences
of loan default, they talk about their family's honor.150 Honor, then, is an
asset that can be collateralized for use in a loan transaction. It can be
leveraged for purposes of starting a small business. And shame is the risk
that the poor incur for the privilege of participating in the market for credit.
1. Collateralization through the mechanism of the solidarity circle
The mechanism by which human worth is collateralized in this context
is the solidarity circle. As is the case with credit reports, those who have
studied peer lending laud the solidarity circle’s ability to solve information
asymmetries,151 without recognizing that the circle also serves as a powerful
behavior modifier. And indeed, the solidarity circle does solve certain
147

See, e.g., Grameen Bank Homepage, Credit delivery system, http://grameen-info.org/bank/cds.html.
I acknowledge the existence of other factors that enhance the potency of peer pressure and the consequent
likelihood of repayment in this setting. These include the methodology of lending to only one or two circle
members at a time and the expectations of borrowers that they will be able to borrow from the bank repeatedly.
See Grameen Bank Homepage, Credit delivery system, http://grameen-info.org/bank/cds.html. But, especially
given the fact that default seems regularly to occur when an entire loan center determines that it has the right to
default (see, e.g., TODD, supra note 141, at 153-157), my theory is that honor plays a large part in the peer
pressure that is brought to bear in this context.
149
See, e.g., BORNSTEIN, supra note 135, at 45 (discussing the use of peer pressure to counteract a borrower
who was feeling “lazy” or who “began entertaining dishonorable thoughts”), and at 191 (discussing bank
manager’s comment that the poorest of the poor are not good borrowers because they are “floaters,” “[o]ne day
they’re here, one day they’re there”). See also Cao, supra note 102, at 882-883 (In the context of rotating credit
associations, which are the basis for the peer lending methodology: “Norms of trust and reciprocity make
cooperation possible and ensure that the borrower honors her obligation to repay by continuing to contribute
regular sums into the pool until every member has had an opportunity to draw.”), and at 884 (“[M]embers of an
Ethiopian [rotating credit group] claim that 'it's easier to commit suicide’ than to renege because loss of
community standing is 'not like credit. It won't clear after seven years.' Because rotating credit associations are
embedded in the community, default would result in expulsion from the association, resulting in ‘shame on not
just the individual, but that person's family. It likely would lead to difficulty in getting a job [in the community] or
even getting a marriage partner.’”).
150
RAHMAN, supra note 133, at 75.
151
Levinson, supra note 144, at 396; Solomon, supra note 137, at 198 ("Treating the borrowers as a group
throughout the loan process enables the Bank to reduce its analysis of each loan application, thereby decreasing
the high transaction costs that . . . discourage loans to small businesses. Because group members assume mutual
responsibility for each others' loans, the Bank can reduce staff time devoted to tracking loans and service more
borrowers."); Jaffer, supra note 102, at 201 ("Solidarity lending . . . provides a screening method that is reliable,
inexpensive, and that suffers no diseconomies of scale."); Jacob Yaron, supra note 144, at 55 (“By leaving much
of the screening process in the hands of people who know the borrower very well, Grameen Bank decreases one
element of risk that faces most lenders: imperfect knowledge as to whether a borrower intends to default.”). See
generally Joseph E. Stiglitz, supra note 144.
148
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information asymmetries. The personal relationships among members of
the solidarity circle give them information about their peers that is helpful
in determining whether they will be good credit risks. The Bank takes
advantage of this knowledge by delegating the work of screening borrowers
to members of the circle.
But in Bangladesh, too, the solidarity circle serves the more powerful
purposes of constraining behavior and enabling liquidation. It does so by
taking advantage of an elaborate, socially constructed understanding of
honor, known as "iijat," which is shaped extensively by a sense of
responsibility to the group rather than only (or at all) to the self.152 Islamic
religious norms, village mores and gender roles all inform iijat. Iijat exists
and must be protected and enhanced at the level of the individual
homestead, the family's lineage, and the entire village.153 Responsibilities
for protecting iijat are allocated along gender lines.154 In essence, by acting
according to a set of standards representing ideal feminine behavior, a
woman can maintain and enhance her family's status in the village. These
standards include "shyness," "passivity," and "modesty."155 Moreover,
norms contributing to iijat result in closer scrutiny of women's behavior
than of men's.156 The consequences of loss of iijat are severe and, according
to at least one source, irreversible.157 In contrast to their middle class or
urban peers, for impoverished rural women who are typically unable to
leave their village settings for other locales where they can pursue their
livelihoods, the consequences are also inescapable.158
152
Although a number of studies have discussed the link between the feminine role in rural Bangladesh and
the Bank's decision to lend to women, Rahman (an anthropologist who lived in his study village for 11 months) is
by far the most detailed about the nature and importance of iijat in Bangladeshi society. Thus, for purposes of
understanding the anthropological features of iijat, I rely extensively on Rahman's work, which I believe to be
methodologically quite rigorous. See id. at 22-38 (describing his methodology). I acknowledge, however, the
possibility of bias in his study and in other studies of the Bank. For additional work on the concepts of honor and
shame in rural Bangladeshi society, see, e.g., DAVID MANDELBAUM, WOMEN'S SECLUSION AND MEN'S HONOR:
SEX ROLES IN NORTH INDIA, BANGLADESH AND PAKISTAN (1988); Naila Kabeer, Subordination and Struggle,
168 NEW LEFT REVIEW 95 (1988).
153
RAHMAN, supra note 133, at 56-61, 68-69. Rahman found that the particular use of honor and shame in
his study village was a result of village-level norms that were "culturally constructed." Id. at 74-75.
154
Rahman found that women bear more responsibility overall for protecting and enhancing iijat than men.
Id. at 75.
155
Id. Todd, who is not an anthropologist and in whose methodological rigor I have less faith, nonetheless
describes a different but related concept of dignification known as "lokkhi": "Lokkhi refers to the wife who is
both thrifty and hard working, whose management of the homestead is so competent that there is never want.
Lucky is the man whose wife is lokkhi. He is respected…."). Id. at 98. Todd's description of Lokkhi in rural
Bangladeshi society is similar to the function of iijat in that it places a particular genderized burden on the woman
to enhance the family's honor.
156
RAHMAN, supra note 133, at 75.
157
Id.
158
Goetz & Sen Gupta, supra note 146, at 61 (women's positional vulnerability increases the pressure to
repay); RAHMAN, supra note 133, at 74 (same). Rural Bangladeshi women regularly go to other countries to
work, but they do not have the option to move there permanently. They also do not typically have the option to go
back to their natal families. See e.g., TODD, supra note 141, at 129-148.
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While the process by which credit reporting collateralized human worth
may have been accidental, the Grameen Bank appears always to have
recognized the solidarity circle’s potential for collateralizing iiijat. The
mechanism here is straightforward. The Bank uses a public system of
accountability, which it describes as peer pressure,159 to threaten its
borrowers with a diminution of their family’s honor. In the Bank’s own
words, “the collective responsibility of the group serves as the collateral on
the loan.”160 Certain features of the Bank’s program heighten the peer
pressure on borrowers. For example, the Bank requires borrowers to attend
mandatory weekly meetings of all the borrowers in the village at which
each borrower must provide a weekly payment on her loan.161 Thus, if a
borrower misses or is short on a payment, she must admit this fact in front
of many of the members of her village. The Bank compounds the
humiliation experienced by delinquent borrowers by requiring the entire
group to remain at the meeting, sometimes for hours, while the Bank
questions delinquent borrowers about their tardy payments.162 The practice
puts pressure on non-delinquent borrowers, who cannot return to their
families and work until they are dismissed from the meeting,163 thereby
implicating their honor as well. Thus, while Westerners, who typically are
not aware of the cultural presence of iijat, have assumed that the solidarity
circle functioned primarily as a screening device, its real power is as a
means of harnessing iijat.
On its face, the feminine role imposed by iijat seems inconsistent with
the "courage" and "empowerment" that the Bank claims it locates and
develops in its female borrowers – and which it uses as partial justification
for its decision to lend almost exclusively to women.164 Considered from
the perspective of asset management, however, it is ideal. How better to
increase the gravity of the risk of liquidation than to choose to lend to the
member of society to whom the asset is most important? As a number of
studies have found, if men fail to repay, the consequences are far less
159

Grameen Bank Homepage, Credit delivery system, http://www.grameen-info.org/bank/cds.html (“[T]here
is substantial group pressure to keep individual records clear.”); Grameen Bank Homepage, Breaking the vicious
cycle of poverty through microcredit, http://www.grameen-info.org/bank/bcycle.html (referring to the use of
“powerful peer pressure”).
160
Grameen Bank Homepage, Credit delivery system, http://www.grameen-info.org/bank/cds.html.
161
Mustafa A. Rahman et al., Grameen Bank in Employment Creation and Poverty Alleviation, 4 THE
BANGLADESH PUB. ADMIN. J. 52, 56-57 (1990); RAHMAN, supra note 133, at 123.
162
RAHMAN, supra note 133, at 123.
163
Id. at 123-24.
164
YUNUS, supra note 146, at 45-50 (describing his desire to empower the poor women whom he observed,
which served as an impetus for founding the Grameen Bank), at 64 ("We want only courageous, ambitious
pioneers in our micro-credit program."), and at 71 (describing his anger at the traditional banking system in which
women constituted less than 1% of borrowers); BORNSTEIN, supra note 135, at 140 (describing Yunus's desire to
empower impoverished women); RAHMAN, supra note 133, at 93 (describing the Bank's "public transcript" for
seeking women borrowers as including the desire "to assist [women] to attain a greater socioeconomic
empowerment in society").
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severe: the experience of shame is slight if present at all, and the more
extreme consequences such as ostracism are rare.165 For women, on the
other hand, the consequences of failure to pay can be permanent and severe.
The Bank can literally count on repayment by its female borrowers.
Iijat's importance to rural Bangladeshi women is the key to its value as
collateral. It is a powerful behavior modifier, because women's ongoing
participation in the Grameen program requires stabilized feminine
behavior.166 In that respect, of course, the Bank reinforces the feminine role
in maintaining iijat.167 Moreover, iijat becomes dependent on material gain
and loss. Thus, if a woman is honorable enough to be picked by her peers
to join a circle, she must successfully complete a loan transaction to
maintain her family's iijat.168 Her success as a market actor produces honor;
her failure produces shame. Given the extraordinary saturation of the
Grameen program in many rural villages,169 it seems fair to say that iijat has
a new marketized meaning. Its maintenance is directly linked to a woman's
ability to fulfill a specific feminine role.
Considered in this light, the efforts of Grameen borrowers to repay their
loans at all costs are quite rational. And the costs can be high, including
recycling debt by borrowing from money lenders at exorbitant rates,170
using savings and selling personal assets.171
165
RAHMAN, supra note 133, at 73-74 (describing the Bank's decision to lend less to men (who were
"arrogant" and argumentative) and more to women (who were "submissive" and obedient)), and at 75 (quoting a
borrower: "'For a man, if he is locked inside the bank building for several days, it would mean almost nothing to
other people in the village. But if this happens to a woman, then it will bring [a bad reputation] to her household,
lineage, and village.'"); TODD, supra note 141, at 159-160 ("[M]ainly in response to increasing repayment
problems within male centers, the Grameen Bank Project began a shift towards recruiting mainly women
members."); BORNSTEIN, supra note 135, at 86 (quoting a borrower's husband as saying that "[i]f the bank lent
money to men, . . . they wouldn't get it back so conscientiously").
166
Many microlenders have adopted the peer lending model and have chosen to target women as borrowers.
Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Reflection in a Distant Mirror: Why the West has Misperceived the Grameen Bank's Vision
of Microcredit, 41 STAN. J. INT'L L. 217 (2005). This suggests that some of my claims about the use of honor are
broadly applicable to microlending programs around the world. However, the particular use of iijat may be
unique to the rural Bangladeshi context. Thus, it is important to recognize that, while human worth may serve as
collateral in many of these programs, it may be differently defined and differently deployed even in different
microlending contexts.
167
In the Grameen context, it is actually the members of the solidarity circle, the borrowers, family
members, and the local society who are making the value judgments integral to the construction of the feminine
role (and, as I discuss, the importation of market behavior into that role), but the Bank harnesses those judgments
for purposes of managing its lending program. Thus, it is effectively the Bank that marketizes dignity, by using it
in the lending transaction.
168
Moreover, Rahman has found that the vast majority of female borrowers seek loans from the Bank
because they have been told by their family members to do so. Id. at 76.
169
Grameen Bank Homepage, Grameen Bank, http://grameen-info.org/bank/index.html ("As of July, 2004,
[the Grameen Bank] has 3.7 million borrowers, 96 percent of whom are women. With 1267 branches, GB
provides services in 46,000 villages, covering more than 68 percent of the total villages in Bangladesh.").
170
Id. at 118, 140-145; TODD, supra note 141, at 164-165.
171
RAHMAN, supra note 133, at 118. It is also understandable why women strive to enhance their
genderized roles. While other forces in society might very well motivate women to pursue a specific set of
behaviors distinguishable from "male" behavior, the Bank's use of iijat appears to ensure it.
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2. Iijat as collateral
Though different in important respects from human worth as collateral
in US consumer credit transactions, iijat as used by the Grameen Bank
again exhibits a number of the important features of collateral.
a. Quantifiable
The quantification of iijat by the Grameen Bank is less straightforward a
process than the quantification of human worth by means of credit reporting
in the US. Nevertheless, several cultural phenomena help to quantify iijat
in order to make it more useful to the Bank. For example, the combined
vulnerability and immobility of women borrowers allows the Bank to track
their behavior with ease. Additionally, because most borrowers borrow
repeatedly from the Bank, the Bank is able to track the gravity with which a
borrower treats her repayment obligations. By choosing borrowers who are
more vulnerable to family and social pressures, or whose families have a
higher status in the village, the Bank essentially quantifies human worth,
rendering it capable of comparison among borrowers. The Bank's detailed
statistics about individual borrowers suggest that it may be doing just
that.172
Many of these features are captured in the mechanism of the solidarity
circle. For example, it is actually circle members, rather than the Bank
itself, who make judgments about the relative status (honor) of a loan
applicant and about her vulnerability to peer pressure. Moreover, the
pressure from circle members reinforces a borrower’s sense of all that she
has to lose if she fails to repay her loan on time.
b. Capable of liquidation
The Grameen Bank can liquidate iijat much like US banks can liquidate
human worth, though here too the details are quite different. As I have
described, Grameen borrowing is a very public process. Thus, when a
borrower fails to make a payment, she is humiliated before many of the
people she knows. Women’s particular obligation to maintain iijat ensures
that they understand the dangers of loss of iijat. However, the Bank does
not leave much to chance. It ensures borrower awareness of the
implications of a failure to pay by, for example, talking with the borrower’s
172

BORNSTEIN, supra note 135, at 220-223.
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relatives about payment delinquencies.173
In addition, as Grameen loans become a primary source of wealth
accumulation, a decision by the Bank not to lend again to a delinquent
borrower greatly affects her ability to improve her economic position. In
this respect, the marketization of iijat contributes to the ease by which it can
be liquidated by the Bank.
c. Capable of appreciation
As I have described, a woman's aptitude in fulfilling an idealized
feminine role, as defined by iijat, increases her family's honor. It also
makes her a more desirable candidate for a loan. In this way, women can
cause their collateral to appreciate in value. Interestingly, behavior that
causes asset appreciation contrasts with the empowerment that Westerners
perceive the Bank as encouraging in its women borrowers. The fact that a
very large percentage of borrowers lose control of loan funds to male family
members suggests that the Bank recoups its funds not from successful
microenterprises,174 but rather from the threat to iijat perceived by
borrowers.
d. Meaningful to borrower
Obviously, the centrality of iijat to rural Bangladeshi life makes it an
extraordinarily important asset to collateralize. As is the case for credit card
borrowers in the US, it is difficult to imagine a more potent form of
collateral.
e. Easy to monitor
By its nature, iijat is a public system, dependent on the perception of
others for its potency. Thus, the Grameen Bank is able to rely on the eyes
and ears of circle members to determine the proficiency with which a
borrower is maintaining iijat. By delegating this function to circle
members, the Bank reduces its own costs of lending.
f. Transferable
173
RAHMAN, supra note 133, at 81-83 (“When this peer pressure failed to convince the irregular borrower,
then the institutional pressure (bank workers and bank officers) and wider social pressure (village … leaders) was
imposed on the members of the borrower's household.”). See also BORNSTEIN, supra note 135, at 85.
174
RAHMAN, supra note 133, at 109-113; TODD, supra note 141, at 83-90; Goetz & Sen Gupta, supra note
146, at 61; COUNTS, supra note 135, at 81. See also Taylor, supra note 134, at 327 (describing loss of loan fund
control as a problem in the microcredit industry overseas); DAVID HULME & PAUL MOSLEY, FINANCE AGAINST
POVERTY, VOLUME 1, 129 (1996) (same).
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It does not appear that the Grameen Bank has found a way to repossess
its borrower’s human worth. Thus, as is the case in the US, an important
distinction between human worth as collateral and other forms of collateral
is that the former cannot serve as a means of collecting payment from
delinquent borrowers. Nonetheless, as we have seen, the Bank receives
many of the benefits from collateralizing iijat that lenders typically receive
from security.
3. Law's irrelevance
In Bangladesh, the law simply is irrelevant to the Grameen Bank's
program. In contrast to US credit card lenders, the Bank chooses not to use
legal enforcement, relying exclusively on its system of peer pressure.
Indeed, its founder touts the program's reliance on trust rather than on "legal
instruments," "meaningless paper contracts," or courts.175 Thus, although
the Bank implicitly capitalizes on its borrowers' sense of self worth, the law
does not appear relevant to this process. As in the US, it appears to be the
Bank itself that developed this important innovation in lending practices.
III. UNIVERSAL, HIERARCHICAL, PERSONAL, COMMUNITARIAN?
The remainder of this article explores the nature and implications of the
new collateralization described above. Until now, I have used human
worth, dignity, honor, pride, and personhood interchangeably. However,
lenders and laws probably are warranted in treating pride of status
differently from a sense of human worth, and group honor differently from
individual personhood. It is quite likely that more is at stake in some
instances than in others. Moreover, it is not readily apparent whether
middle class American borrowers are risking the same thing as
impoverished Bangladeshis.
In this section, I begin the process of clarifying the use of human worth
as collateral. To a large extent, this is an ends-driven process, both limited
and biased by the examples I have used to support my hypothesis. I attempt
here only to identify a process of social evolution in two lending schemes.
Moreover, my focus necessarily is more on Western notions of human
worth, and on the US example, because the details of Bangladeshi society,
and its understanding of human worth, are far more opaque to me.
Western philosophical discussions often refer to human worth as
175

YUNUS, supra note 146, at 70.
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dignity. Dignity has been described as that which distinguishes human
beings from other animals:
The dignity and pre-eminence of human nature by which it
excels over other living beings required that human acts were
judged according to a fixed norm, because there cannot be
conceived of any order, splendor or beauty beyond this dignity.176
Beyond this basic definition, however, dignity always has been a
multifaceted and paradoxical concept. A primary paradox inherent in
Western notions of dignity, for example, is its simultaneous universality (in
that it is an attribute of all human beings) and utility as a status-enhancer (in
that it distinguishes among human beings). Four images of dignity resonate
particularly well in the lending contexts described here.
A. Universal
Since its emergence in the West, dignity has been defined as universal
in nature.177 As expressed by Immanuel Kant: "a person...is not to be
valued merely as a means to the ends of others or even to his own ends, but
as an end in himself, that is, he possesses a dignity...by which he exacts
respect for himself from all other rational beings in the world."178
According to this image of dignity, it is immutable and thus incapable of
being lost.179 It is therefore a source of equality among human beings.180
176

Samuel Pufendorf, De iure naturae et gentium, in GESAMMELTE WERKE, vol. 4 (F. Bohling, ed., 1998).
Cicero, for example, described human dignity as inherent “in human nature.” Hubert Cancik, ‘Dignity of
Man’ and ‘Persona” in Stoic Anthropology: Some Remarks on Cicero, De Officiis I 105-107, in THE CONCEPT
OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 19 (David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002).
178
IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 434-435 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991) (1797).
179
See Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men, in THE
DISCOURSES AND OTHER EARLY POLITICAL WRITINGS 111, 166 (Victor Gourevitch ed. & trans., 1997) (1766);
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Of the Social Contract, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND OTHER LATER POLITICAL
WRITINGS 39 (Victor Gourevitch ed. & trans., 1997) (1762); Michael J. Meyer, Introduction to THE
CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 1, 4-7 (Michael J. Meyer & William A.
Parent eds., 1992) (discussing Paine’s emphasis on the "natural dignity of man" as counter to historical views of
dignity as rank). The link between dignity and the intrinsic moral value, and the resulting imperative, of human
beings also has roots in many Western religious traditions. See Yehoshua Arieli, On the Necessary and Sufficient
Conditions for the Emergence of the Doctrine of the Dignity of Man and his Rights, in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN
DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE 1, 10 (D. Kretzmer & E. Klein eds., 2002) (describing the Biblical
sources of the "feeling of awe, of pride and humility in the relationship between man and God which lies at the
basis of the concept of the inherent dignity of man"); Mary Ann Glendon, Foundations of Human Rights: The
Unfinished Business, 44 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 13 (1999) ("Most [religious] believers . . . would say that dignity is
grounded in the fact that human beings are made in the image and likeness of God."). See also ANITA GANERI &
MARCUS BRAYBROOKE, RELIGIONS EXPLAINED (1997); LOUIS P. POJMAN, ON EQUAL HUMAN WORTH: A
CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY EGALITARIANISM, IN EQUALITY 282 (Louis P. Pojman & Robert Westmoreland,
eds., 1997); EMIL BRUNNER, THE DIVINE IMPERATIVE (1947). There are similar examples of the association
between dignity and the human moral condition in non-Western religions. See generally GANERI &
BRAYBROOKE.
180
See, RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 198 (1977) ("Anyone who professes to take rights
seriously, and who praises our Government for respecting them, must have some sense of what that point is. He
177
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The universalist image of dignity has been enormously important to
Western legal traditions. It was central to the development of the United
Nations Charter181 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.182 It
has also been important in Supreme Court jurisprudence interpreting the US
Constitution.183 In contemporary legal debates, dignity informs arguments
that human beings cannot be assigned a market value.184 For example,
dignity is used in bioethics discussions to argue against the patentability of
human beings (or their genes or other parts).185
Universalist dignity also appears to have a place in credit card lending
and microlending, though as we shall see, so does the more hierarchical
version of dignity. In contrast to owning a house or a refrigerator,
presumably everyone has a sense of honor that can serve as collateral for a
loan.186 In this respect, then, human worth as collateral has an equitable
must accept, at the minimum, one or both of two important ideas. The first is the vague but powerful idea of
human dignity. This idea, associated with Kant, but defended by philosophers of different schools, supposes that
there are ways of treating a man that are inconsistent with recognizing him as a full member of the human
community, and holds that such treatment is profoundly unjust."); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Moral Death: A Kantian
Essay on Psychopathy, 82 ETHICS 291 (1972) ("[I]n claiming a right . . . [one] speaks legitimately only insofar as
he is prepared to recognize and respect his obligation to defer to others' rights in similar kinds of circumstances.");
THOMAS NAGEL, THE POSSIBILITY OF ALTRUISM 107 (1970) ("[O]ne's basic practical principles must be
universal."). This view has also been attributed to John Rawls. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 151
(1971) (concluding that individuals who are unaware of their social status, natural abilities and other external
factors will "establish[] equal liberty for all, including equality of opportunity, as well as an equal distribution of
income and wealth.").
181
The Preamble to the United Nations Charter states: "We the Peoples of the United Nations Determined ...
to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person ...." U.N. Charter
preamble.
182
The Preamble to the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights begins: "Whereas recognition of the
inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of
freedom, justice and peace in the world." Universal Declaration of Human Rights pmbl., G.A. Res. 217, U.N.
GAOR. 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). Article I of that document states: "All human beings are born
free and equal in dignity and rights." Id. art. I.
183
See Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye Suk, Adding Insult to Injury: Questioning the Role of Dignity in
Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1921 (2003).
184
See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996). For a helpful description of the debates
concerning commodification of human beings, see Note, The Price of Everything, the Value of Nothing:
Reframing the Commodification Debate 117 HARV. L. REV. 689 (2003).
185
See, e.g., DAVID BEYLEVELD & ROGER BROWNSWORD, HUMAN DIGNITY IN BIOETHICS AND BIOLAW
(2001); David B. Resnik, DNA Patents and Human Dignity, 29 J.L. MEDICINE & ETHICS 152, 155-156 (2001)
("The principle of humanity also implies that moral worth is held equally, as it does not make sense to say that
someone has greater moral value than someone else does. . . . Thus, if human beings have intrinsic value, then
they have a value or worth that cannot be captured in markets terms; their worth cannot be measured in terms of a
price.").
Similar arguments have been made concerning sale of human organs. See, e.g., Leon R. Kass, Organs for
Sale? Propriety, Property, and the Price of Progress, in POLITICS AND THE HUMAN BODY: ASSAULT ON DIGNITY
153 (Jean Bethke Elshtain & J. Timothy Cloyd eds., 1995); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987).
186
In the case of the Grameen Bank, for example, women who were foreclosed from market participation
because they had nothing were allowed to leverage dignity as collateral. See supra notes 148-151 and
accompanying text. See also Taylor, supra note 134, at 319 (discussing microcredit programs’ targeting of the
“poorest of the poor” and women because “as a group, they often face social barriers to entry into the formal
economy and turn to the informal sector to provide for themselves and their families”).
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quality. It can be argued that by quantifying and collateralizing human
worth, banks in the US and Bangladesh have leveled the playing field of the
market; they have created opportunities for market participation where such
opportunities might previously not have existed.187 The egalitarian aspect
of human worth as collateral may also be linked to some of the positive
externalities for which commentators have praised these lending programs.
These can include a Weberian valorization of wealth resulting from
watching one's peers behave in a disciplined manner,188 the creation of role
models in economically marginalized communities,189 and, most
ambitiously, the idealization and replication of the middle class.190
Thus, it seems possible that modern-day lenders are successfully
capturing a universalist form of dignity that goes to the very core of humanness. Indeed, universalist dignity as collateral may partly explain the
seemingly irrational decision by credit card lenders to lend to financially
marginalized consumers. To the extent the credit market is successfully
harnessing universal dignity, the advantages for both lenders and borrowers
are quite significant. The economic benefits described above could allow
people along a far broader socio-economic spectrum to accumulate wealth
via credit. Perhaps credit will never be universal, but it might be more
broadly distributive. The democratic nature of the credit card industry’s
current marketing practices might also help to reduce racial and other
discrimination in lending practices. It will be interesting to observe, in the
next decade, whether credit card lenders overtake predatory, pay day and
other marginal lenders in providing credit to populations whom mainstream
banking services currently exclude. Obviously, such benefits will only
evolve if appropriate regulations limit predatory tendencies on the part of
credit card lenders. 191
187
An analogy might be found in the debates about whether to deregulate (or reduce regulation of)
adoptions. See, e.g., Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL
STUD. 323 (1978); Ronald A. Cass, Coping With Life, Law, and Markets: A Comment on Posner and the Lawand-Economics Debate, 67 B.U. L. REV. 73 (1987); Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in
Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REV. 59 (1987); George William Myers, Jr., Independent Adoptions: Is the Black and White
Beginning to Appear in the Controversy Over Gray-Market Adoptions?, 18 DUQ. L. REV. 629 (1980).
188
See SIMON, supra note 102, at 56-57.
189
Id.
190
See David Dante Troutt, Ghettoes Made Easy: The Metamarket/Antimarket Dichotomy and The Legal
Challenges of Inner-City Economic Development, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV., 427, 427-434 (2000) (discussing
the connection between "wealth formation and consumer infrastructures" and "a relationship with government
typically characterized by political participation and accommodation"); Anthony D. Taibi, Banking, Finance, And
Community Economic Empowerment: Structural Economic Theory, Procedural Civil Rights, and Substantive
Racial Justice, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1463, 1521-1522 (1994) (“Developing credit in low- and moderate-income
communities is vital to our nation's economic prospects … [Community development financial institutions']
lending programs encourage entrepreneurship, self-sufficiency, and creative problem solving—essential qualities
for national and community economic prosperity, and for breaking the cycles of poverty and welfare
dependency.”).
191
Elsewhere, I discuss the problem of predatory credit card lending. Dyal-Chand, From Status to Contract,
supra note 119, Part II.B.
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B. Hierarchical

But historically, dignity has always had another face, one that directly
contradicts its universal quality. According to this image, dignity is
available only to those who deserve it. It is a status enhancer. Thus, for
example, in both Ancient Rome192 and eighteenth century Europe,193 the
aristocracy was dignified and virtuous, and those of lower rank were not.
Recent scholarship has proposed that, although this hierarchical image of
dignity has been de-emphasized in post-war political and philosophical
thinking, it nonetheless underlies popular understandings of dignity in such
areas as privacy rights194 and laws on sex and sexuality.195 As James
Whitman points out, for example, although contemporary European privacy
laws protect all members of society, their roots (and their underlying logic
and primary purpose) are in the protection of high-status people from public
insult or exposure.196
In contrast (perhaps) to its more historical or marginal importance in
such areas as privacy laws, hierarchical dignity plays a much more central
role in contemporary lending schemes. In the first place, human worth
cannot serve as collateral if it is immutable. The possibility of liquidation
presupposes a hierarchical form of human worth whereby borrowers who
do not repay their debts are publicly shamed. This means both that human
worth must be capable of reduction and also that those who use human
worth as collateral must care about their social status. To a lender, human
worth is not very meaningful collateral when offered by a borrower who
cares little for her reputation. Note that this does not presume that only the
rich or those of high social rank can collateralize their human worth; as both
my examples suggest, the poor also care about their honor. But we ought to
be able to imagine some prototypes in each society for whom human worth
is less meaningful: the prostitute in Bangladesh, or the homeless person
living on a street corner in the US.197
In addition to these logistical considerations, human worth as collateral
is a status enhancer because it enables consumers to acquire status192

Cancik, supra note 177 at 20.
Whitman, supra note 94, at 1165-66.
194
Id.
195
Libby Adler, Dignity and Degradation: Transnational Lessons from the Constitutional Protections of
Sex, [forthcoming].
196
Whitman, supra note 94, at 1169-70.
197
Obviously, there are excellent counterarguments that prostitutes and homeless people have dignity too,
but it seems quite possible that non-mainstream definitions of dignity, and means of dignification, exist among
these populations.
193
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enhancing goods and services on credit. In the US, as I have argued here
and elsewhere,198 credit is used as a means to attain middle class status by
means of material symbols of wealth. In Bangladesh, Grameen borrowers
use their loans overtly to establish small businesses and covertly to buy
land, pay dowries and otherwise raise their social status.199 Additionally, in
both the US and Bangladesh, creditworthiness is itself a source of pride.200
In this respect, the use of human worth as collateral shapes human worth.
Thus, at the same time that universalist dignity as collateral allows greater
access to credit, hierarchical dignity as collateral contributes to economic
and social stratification.
C. Personhood
A third image of human worth that resonates with its use as collateral is
that of personhood as dependent upon control of property, a connection
explored in detail by Professor Radin.201
Building on Hegel's
conceptualization that "[a] person becomes a real self only by engaging in a
property relationship with something external,"202 Radin concludes that
there are certain things, such as one's physical home or a wedding ring, that
help constitute a person203 and that these things justify greater property
entitlements.204 Thus, the legal right of privacy in one's home is not, Radin
argues, just about the right of liberty. It is also a recognition that the home
embodies personhood.205
Radin's analysis is relevant here in at least two respects. First, the
collateralization of human worth works a curious inversion on the
Radin/Hegel formulation. Using Hegel's description, the use of human
worth in the consumer credit context could be described as follows: a
person becomes a real self by engaging in a property relationship with
herself. In this new formulation, the thing propertized is not even as
"external" as one's organs, which are among the types of "personal"
property that Radin describes as potentially self constituting.206 It is one's
personhood. Perhaps this is a refutation of, or at least a limitation to,
Radin's analysis. Perhaps it is a modern extension.
198
See supra notes 84-102 and accompanying text. See also Dyal-Chand, From Status to Contract, supra
note 119, Part III.B.
199
RAHMAN, supra note 133, at 106-107; TODD, supra note 141, at 24.
200
See supra notes 103, 168-169 and accompanying text.
201
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, supra note 25.
202
Id. at 972-973.
203
Id. at 959-961, 986-988.
204
Id. at Part V.
205
Id. at 991-992.
206
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The Radin/Hegel formulation also can be used aptly to describe the
importance of credit in contemporary society. Given the importance of
credit as a means of wealth formation, credit could be said to be that
external thing upon which modern consumers can act in order to become
"real selves." In other words, credit produces personhood. Again, this
conceptualization propertizes personhood, emphasizing its utilitarian and
hierarchical nature. It also gives credit a role that is simultaneously more
central and more intimate than the law currently recognizes.
D. Communitarian
Although Western conceptualizations of dignity focus largely on the
dignity and the attendant rights of the individual, some non-Western
understandings define dignity as an attribute of a community. The
following formulation of a common African belief suggests a group-based
sense of dignity that is in marked contrast with Kant’s idea of a person as an
“end in himself,” exacting respect “from all other rational beings”207: "I am
because we are, and because we are therefore I am."208 Often associated
with group-based understandings of self worth is a sense of duty to the
group as well as, or some times instead of, a sense of entitlement vis-à-vis
the group.209 This formulation has practical consequences. In the debate
about human rights norms, for example, a communitarian notion of dignity
might lead to laws seeking to develop, maintain and protect any given
person’s “physical and psychic security of group membership.”210 Thus, as
Makau Wa Mutua discusses, the state might focus on the rights of the
family in addition to or instead of the rights of the individual.211
Those who have studied communitarian dignity debate whether this
image of dignity masks cultural relativism and the elitist enforcement of
social stratification.212 However, communitarian dignity is not necessarily
either egalitarian or hierarchical. At the most basic level, it is merely an
acknowledgment that a person’s sense of self is informed by (or even
embodied in) her belonging to one or more groups.
Communitarian dignity clearly plays a role in the Grameen Bank’s use
207
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of the solidarity circle to modify the behavior of its women borrowers. Iijat,
the version of human worth that serves as collateral in this context, defines
and is defined by membership in a group, or more specifically in a number
of groups: the nuclear family, the extended family, and the village. Iijat
also defines gender roles. By harnessing iijat, the Bank contributes to its
preservation. Those who do not care about their family’s or village’s honor
are not going to be desirable candidates for a Grameen loan.
It is difficult to know whether the Bank’s use of iijat as collateral also
changes iijat. The Grameen context could exemplify the fact that
communitarian dignity need not be hierarchical. Studies of women
borrowers in the Grameen system have found women who perform their
roles as equal partners with the male members of their family and who are
valued equally for their contributions.213 Unfortunately, however, these
examples appear to be more rare than those of women burdened by the
hierarchical version of iijat.214 At the very least, it seems that the
collateralization of iijat changes iijat into something more marketized than
its original meaning.
While communitarian dignity has an important role in Bangladesh, it is
not entirely absent from the US context. Importantly, the status-enhancing
use of dignity by credit card lenders works in part because people try to
associate themselves with the middle class or with a particular
neighborhood. These attempts at group membership help define people’s
self worth. However, this type of communitarianism is very different from
that embodied in iijat. At bottom, the use of group-based notions of dignity
appears to be more different than similar between the two contexts.
E. Differences and Similarities
What we see in these two examples, then, are all four aspects of dignity.
It is likely that the Bangladeshi example emphasizes communitarian values
more than the US example, and that the US example emphasizes more
individualistic notions of dignity. Thus, while individuals in both contexts
feel profound shame over bad credit, the reasons might be different. In the
US, the shame might result from loss of status vis-à-vis others, whereas in
Bangladesh it might result from a sense of failing one’s group.215 It is also
213
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possible that the Hegelian notion of property for personhood resonates more
deeply in the US.
Although an in-depth cross-cultural analysis is beyond the scope of this
article, the details of what is being collateralized and the ways in which
collateralization occurs quite likely differ from context to context. For
those who, like me, seek to understand the effect of rule of law initiatives,
these differences are important because they can, among other things, help
explain the extent to which target populations embrace cross-cultural
development programs. For example, we might find that the positive
externalities resulting from the collateralization of universalist dignity in the
US do not occur in Bangladesh because Bangladeshi women value wealth
using a communitarian lens rather than an individualistic one.
But we also see a startlingly similar use of human worth in two
completely different programs, with different social and cultural histories
and norms. In both the credit card lending and peer lending contexts,
consumers are using a hierarchical version of dignity to secure credit.
Moreover, in both places, the credit obtained enables wealth accumulation
in the form of material assets and income generation, and credit itself
functions as a form of wealth. Also, in both contexts, credit informs human
worth by being a source of pride. Finally, in both contexts, the
collateralization of human worth appears to accomplish broader distribution
of credit and wealth. The process is a cycle in which human worth as
collateral reinforces hierarchical dignity, which produces a broader
distribution of credit, and reinforces the marketization of human worth.
IV. THE RULE OF THE MARKET?
There are many lessons to be learned from the uses of human worth by
contemporary lenders. At the pragmatic level, it is important to gain a more
empirical understanding of what this new collateralization means to lenders
and borrowers. What opportunities and risks do they identify? How do
they value dignity as collateral? Do the benefits accruing from broader
distribution of credit by means of universalist dignity outweigh the
disadvantages of social stratification by means of hierarchical dignity?
Moreover, what legal regulation is required in this new context? In addition
to these pragmatic questions, there are important sociological
considerations. How does the collateralization of human worth change
social and cultural understandings of human worth? What additional
images of dignity resonate in this context? There are also important
economic concerns. Is human worth the new home? Will it produce the
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same benefits that homeownership has produced in the US? Can it be used
to solve market failures in the inner city? Or is it an inherently limited
asset?
But my purpose in discussing these two examples here is to explore a
hypothesis about globalization, markets, human worth and the rule of law.
The piece of this phenomenon about which I want to comment is the fact of
convergence, how it happened and what it can teach us. Again, many more
details are necessary to substantiate this or any other guess about the cause,
but several aspects of the convergence are striking.
First, certain characteristics of human worth consistently materialize
when it serves as collateral. In both contexts, it is hierarchical, utilitarian
and broadly distributive. Thus, it appears that human worth is not just
collateralized in the two settings, but also that it is in a sense consolidated.
It does not appear, however, that such a consolidating force found its
basis in legal rules exported from the West to the East. This is the second
striking aspect of the convergence. As I have argued, in both contexts, the
law has failed to recognize this new use of human worth. While noteworthy
for many reasons, for my purposes this failure is important because it has
occurred against a backdrop of two decades in which the West has written
commercial legal codes for the East.216 Property rules,217 banking rules,218
and rules about secured and unsecured lending219 all have found their way
to the East from the desks of Western lawyers. But legal scholars continue
to wonder whether these rules can successfully be exported. Will they
216
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succeed in making transactions more efficient?220 Will they improve the
wealth of the nations that use them, or at least make these nations more
effective trading partners with Western nations?221 Is the rule of law, in
other words, meaningful in accomplishing economic development?
I think the convergence of human worth as collateral in these two
lending schemes serves as a counter-example to the claimed centrality of
the rule of law. In the US, a system where secured lending is wellestablished, lenders are choosing to lend outside of the formal parameters of
both Article 9 and the laws on unsecured lending. Formally, they are
exercising the rights of unsecured creditors. But informally, they are taking
advantage of a much more powerful force by collateralizing human worth.
One indication of this informal enforcement is the extensive and effective
use of bill collectors.222 In Bangladesh, the Grameen Bank uses no court
enforcement at all, relying exclusively on peer pressure to enforce
repayment.223 In these examples, the lenders are structuring an extremely
effective market for credit without the aid of laws that should be directly
applicable.224
I suspect instead that the consolidating force at work in these two
contexts is the credit market and that it is globalizing both lending practices
and notions of human worth. The third noteworthy piece of the
convergence, then, is that the lenders’ quest to solve information
asymmetries in both contexts produced a much more effective means of
protecting the lenders than the information itself produced. In the US,
credit reports are an extremely concise, accurate, and low-cost means of
capturing information about borrowers, but their real power lies in the threat
220
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they pose to borrowers’ sense of self worth. In Bangladesh, the solidarity
circle provides information to the Grameen Bank about individual
borrowers’ creditworthiness, but the real power of the circle lies in its
ability to harness iijat. In other words, lenders in two very different
contexts shared quite similar problems of information asymmetry in the
absence of collateral. Both types of lenders solved these problems by
creating a new kind of collateral out of a mechanism that was meant to
solve information asymmetries. And both did it without aid of legal rules.
The final observation about this convergence is that the credit market
rather than the law is operating as the carrier of norms about things as
fundamental as human worth.
As we have seen, collateralization
strengthens some aspects of human worth that might not otherwise have
been so socially or culturally salient. This should come as something of a
surprise to proponents of the rule of law who have argued that it is a
necessary teacher of the norms of market behavior. In my examples, by
quantifying and publicizing their use of human worth, the lenders
themselves imprinted norms of utilitarian behavior, credit as a basic right
and a source of wealth, transparency, and predictability. While this
conclusion certainly does not vindicate the "invisible hand" theory of the
market, it does suggest that the convergence described here is the result of a
series of events that were not executed in a concerted manner or coordinated
by experts. The provocative version of this point is that the market is
playing a governing role that rule-of-law theorists expect to be played by
governmental, legal and other experts.
Thus, the emergence of human worth as collateral ought to serve as a
useful lesson both to proponents of globalized markets and to resistors.
Both might better devote their attention to understanding convergences such
as this one rather than advocating or resisting the exportation of formal
laws. These examples suggest that globalization deeply affects the behavior
of both lenders and borrowers. If these examples typify commercial
practices more generally, then students of globalized markets would be well
advised to study the mechanisms by which market actors in different local
contexts solve problems of information asymmetry and other market
failures. Indeed, if these examples signal a trend, then perhaps development
experts in the East ought to seek out Western business people rather than
Western lawyers.

